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Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived
Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs
Danshera Cords ∗
“For voluntary self-assessment to be both meaningful and productive of
revenues, the citizens must not only have confidence in the fairness of the
tax laws, but also in the uniform and vigorous enforcement of these
laws.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year hundreds of thousands of taxpayers use abusive schemes
to avoid paying some or all of their federal income taxes. 2 Tax avoidance
schemes include abusive tax shelters, fraudulent transactions, and

∗ Associate Professor of Law, Academic Director of Graduate Law Programs, Capital
University Law School; LL.M. in Taxation 2000, New York University School of Law; J.D. 1998,
Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 1991, University of Washington. I would like to thank Karen
S. Dean, Brant J. Hellwig, Donald A. Hughes Jr., Jeffrey Kahn, Marvin C. Kloeppel, Leandra
Lederman, and the participants of the Ohio Legal Scholars Workshop: Christopher Bryant, Regina
Burch, Charles Cohen, Benjamin Davis, Mark Godsey, Kenneth Katkin, Michael Mannheimer,
Susan Rozelle, and Angela Upchurch for their helpful and insightful comments on earlier drafts of
this article. Any errors or omissions are, of course, my own. I would also like to thank Capital
University Law School for its financial support.
1. John F. Kennedy, U.S. President, Special Message to the Congress on Taxation (Apr. 20,
1961), quoted in Mortimer Caplin, The State of IRS Administration and Our Tax System in General,
103 TAX NOTES 473, 473 (2004).
2. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE EFFORTS TO
IDENTIFY AND COMBAT ABUSIVE TAX SCHEMES HAVE INCREASED, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN,
GAO-02-733, at 2 (2002). In tax-year 2000, approximately 740,000 returns were filed using one
abusive scheme or another. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
ENHANCED EFFORTS TO COMBAT ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS—CHALLENGES REMAIN, GAO-02-618T,
at 1 (Testimony of Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues (2002)). In 2001, at least 152,000
individual income tax returns were filed by tax protestors. David Cay Johnston, U.S. Discloses That
Use of Tax Evasion Plans Is Extensive, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at C4 (citing Justice Department
estimates of returns filed falsely claiming no taxes were due or using abusive schemes to receive a
refund); see also Testimony of Micheal Brostek, supra at 6 (noting that 62,000 frivolous returns,
105,000 frivolous refund claims, and 65,000 abuse domestic trusts were claimed in 2000, for a total
loss to the Treasury of $6.8 billion). Because this number includes only filed returns, it does not
include individuals who failed or refused to file a tax return. In addition, more than 1,500 businesses
refuse to withhold taxes from their employees, some claiming that income taxes are voluntary. Id.;
David Cay Johnston, Boast of Refusal to Pay Taxes Leads to 27-Count Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2003, at A1.
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approaches based on an erroneous belief that the federal tax system
either is illegitimate or is inapplicable to certain taxpayers. Those who
believe that the tax system is illegal or inapplicable are commonly
referred to as tax protestors. The following excerpt is typical of the
written statements that tax protestors include frequently with their tax
returns and court filings:
[THE TAXPAYER], UPON PRESENTMENT BY INTERNAL
REVENUE, RETURNED AND REFUSED FOR CAUSE UCC
3-501 SAID PRESENTMENTS WITHOUT DISHONOR. IN
ADDITION, [THE TAXPAYER], IS NOT A “U.S. CITIZEN”
NEITHER IS HE A ‘RESIDENT NOR INHABITANT’ OF
THE U.S. AND HAS NO INCOME EFFECTIVELY
CONNECTED WITH THE UNITED STATES THAT [THE
TAXPAYER] DID NOT KNOWINGLY OR VOLUNTARILY
ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT TO BE
LIABLE FOR THE NATIONAL DEBT, OR ‘ELECTED’ TO
BE TREATED AS A RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
UNDER 26 CFR PART 5h; 26 USC, SECTION 6013(g) & (h) BY
THE SIGNING OF FORM 1040 OR OTHER RELATED U.S.
FORMS. [THE TAXPAYER] IS NOT A PARTY TO ANY
TRANSACTION WITH THE U.S. LET THE U.S. PRODUCE
THE ORIGINAL SIGNED CONTRACT [SEC.] 871 4(b)
FURTHER PETITIONER SAYETH NOT. 3
Fortunately, most people in the United States pay their taxes when
and in the amount required. Between eighty and eighty-five percent of all
taxes owed are timely paid. 4 Most Americans believe that tax

3. Nagy v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1854, 1854–55 (1996) (quoting from the taxpayer’s
petition) (capitals in original).
4. See, e.g., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE’S REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2006
OBJECTIVES 6 (2005); Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax
Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2003); Leandra Lederman, The
Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1459 (2003)
[hereinafter Lederman, Interplay]; Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 971, 973 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, The Reformed IRS]; James Andreoni, Brian
Erard & Johnathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 818, 819 (1998). In fact, the tax
compliance rate is even higher for amounts subject to mandatory withholding. The compliance rate
for wage earners is estimated to be up to 98%, perhaps reflecting the relative lack of opportunity to
avoid compliance. The Reformed IRS, supra at 975–76; Phil Brand, IRS’s Worker Classification
Program—An Inside Look at New Ways to Resolve the Problems, 85 J. Tax’n 17, 19 (1996) (citing
unpublished IRS data suggesting that the compliance rate for wage earners may exceed 98%). For
groups not subject to withholding, an estimated 42% of the tax due is voluntarily paid. Lederman,
The Reformed IRS, supra at 976.
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compliance is an important element of patriotism and personal integrity. 5
Compliance is important because when individuals and businesses fail to
pay their taxes when due, compliant taxpayers must bear more than their
fair share of the costs of government services. Moreover, businesses and
sole proprietors that avoid or evade their tax obligations may be more
competitive than their tax compliant counterparts because tax avoiders
have lower costs.
Successful tax avoidance by some can undermine the confidence that
compliant taxpayers have that the tax system fairly distributes its burden
among all those who benefit from government services. Maintaining a
high rate of compliance, however, requires that noncompliance have
consequences. 6 Unless there are significant consequences to tax
noncompliance, compliant taxpayers view the tax system as unfair
because they are forced to assume more than their share of the tax
burden. 7
A subset of the larger group of tax avoiders are tax protestors. Tax
protestors use frivolous and illegitimate arguments against the obligatory
nature of government assessed taxes to justify their refusal to pay their
taxes. Tax protestor schemes are often promoted in seminars, in books,
and on the Internet. 8 The increased number of tax protestors may be
attributable in part to the expansion of the Internet and the ease with
which it allows tax protestors to spread their message. Although tax
protestors constitute only a small percentage of all taxpayers, they are
extremely vocal and are growing in number; 9 the number of tax protestor

5. In response to the statement “[i]t is every American’s civic duty to pay their fair share of
taxes,” 94% of the individuals surveyed in the 2004 Taxpayer Attitude Survey responded that they
either “Completely Agree” (73%) or “Mostly Agree” (21%). INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
OVERSIGHT
BOARD,
2004
TAXPAYER
ATTITUDE
SURVEY,
at
5,
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/documents/release040405.pdf. Similarly, 91% of the respondents
identified personal integrity as providing “[a] great deal of influence” (79%) or being “[s]omewhat
of an influence” (12%) on their tax compliance. Id. at 7.
6. Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. See infra Section II; see also Testimony of Michael Brostek, supra note 3, at 2; Johnston,
infra note 9.
9. David Cay Johnston, Another Tax Denier Will Have His Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2005, at C2.
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returns filed increased from 7,123 in 1979 10 to 18,226 in 1980 11 and to
more than 152,000 in 2001. 12
Individuals who are dissatisfied with the government and its policies
are more likely to be convinced that the tax system is illegitimate than
are individuals who are satisfied with the government and its policies. 13
An even greater concern is the possibility that growing numbers of tax
protestors will be deleterious to tax compliance. General tax compliance
may be adversely affected by a perception or reality that others are
successfully avoiding payment of part or all of their tax liability. 14
As the number of tax protestors increases, the costs associated with
collecting their taxes and prosecuting their tax avoidance also increase.
To prevent compliant taxpayers from unfairly bearing these costs, these
costs should be shifted back to the tax protestors. Although this approach
would be inappropriate if it was applied to all tax disputes, it is
nevertheless appropriate to shift the costs to tax protestors whose truly
frivolous positions waste administrative and judicial resources.
Addressing the challenges raised by tax protestors who actively
avoid their tax obligations increases the cost of tax collection. Although
it would be possible to simply ignore all of the frivolous tax-protestor
claims, tax protestor contentions must be reviewed. Even someone who
does not acknowledge the government’s power to collect taxes can have
a legitimate challenge to the amount that the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS” or “the Service”) asserts is the correct tax liability. If the courts
and the Service dismiss all tax protestor claims without any
consideration, some legitimate claims will be missed, which may reduce
the public confidence in the fairness of the overall tax system eventually

10. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTERS THREATEN
TAX SYSTEM, GGD-81-83 app. II, at 46 (1981) (citing IRS statistics on tax protestor returns).
11. Id.
12. See supra note 2.
13. See Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Protest, “A Homosexual,” and Frivolity: A
Deconstructionist Meditation, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 21 n.24 (2005); Marjorie E. Kornhauser,
Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America,
50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 906–07 (2002) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Legitimacy]; Marjorie E. Kornhauser,
For God and Country: Taxing Conscience, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 939, 942 [hereinafter Kornhauser,
Taxing Conscience]; Christopher S. Jackson, Comment, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist
Rendering Unto Caesar—Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (1996–1997); Thomas J.
Purcell, III, An Analysis of the Formation of Federal Tax Policy, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 654–
55 (1984–1985); Beryl N. Simpson, Constitutional Protection for Creative Tax Shelter Promoters:
Ninth Circuit Restricts the Government’s Arsenal of Power—United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d
1423 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2363 (1984), 59 WASH. L. REV. 927, 943 n.103 (1984).
14. See infra Part II.B.
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reducing tax compliance. In addition, some inarticulate taxpayers with
legitimate claims could be incorrectly identified as tax protestors, and in
such cases dismissal without review would mean that legitimate claims
would not be considered.
This Article argues that tax protestors impose significant,
unwarranted costs on tax administration, and tax protestors are neither
adequately deterred nor sufficiently punished under the current
framework of civil and criminal penalties. This Article proposes that
taxpayers putting forth identified tax protestor positions in support of a
contention that an individual or entity is not subject to taxation should be
required to pay a penalty equal to the costs incurred by the Service and
the courts to collect legitimate tax liabilities. 15 In the interest of
consistent treatment of similarly situated taxpayers and increasing the
perceived fairness of the tax collection system, the penalty must be
mandatory rather than discretionary. This penalty would effectively shift
the costs of tax noncompliance from the compliant taxpayer back to the
tax protestor who caused the cost in the first place.
This Article begins with an overview of the problem of tax
noncompliance. Section A of Part II discusses the scope of the problem,
and Section B discusses why some taxpayers comply while others do not.
Part III evaluates the rhetoric and arguments of tax protestors and
concludes that these arguments, which the courts have uniformly
rejected, cannot be disregarded without harming the perceived fairness of
the tax system and without adversely impacting tax compliance rates. 16
Part IV discusses the collection process and taxpayer rights, which
include the rights created by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998). 17 Part IV also considers how these
rights may increase the perception of fairness yet also impose significant
costs on the tax system when abused by tax protestors.

15. This Article does not address tax underpayment resulting from aggressive positions.
While such positions are of concern to the government and are often abusive, aggressive taxpayers
usually acknowledge the legitimacy of government tax collection. Approaches designed to increase
aggressive taxpayers’ compliance rates will likely differ from approaches that increase tax protestor
compliance and prevent the conversion of others to the tax protestor movement. Thus, the same
approaches are unlikely to be successful in addressing these very different reasons for
noncompliance.
16. Tax protestors frequently use quotations and excerpts out of context. See, e.g., Bell v.
United States, 414 F.3d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 2005). To the extent that mainstream taxpayers buy in to
these arguments and begin to refuse to pay taxes, tax compliance will be harmed.
17. Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of 26
U.S.C.) [hereinafter RRA 1998].
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Part V discusses the current penalty structure, with an emphasis on
the civil penalties available for taking and promoting frivolous positions.
This Part also discusses recent proposals to discourage or penalize
protestor behavior.
Part VI argues that a different approach to penalizing tax protestors
is needed because the current penalty structure does not effectively deter
tax protestor behavior. This Part proposes that nondiscretionary penalties
equal to the cost of collecting taxes from tax protestors would increase
the public’s perception of fairness and minimize the likelihood that
currently compliant taxpayers may cease to comply with their tax
obligations.
This Article does not argue that citizens should not question the
government, its powers, its programs, or its actions. The refusal to pay
legitimate taxes is distinguishable from the use of legal methods to
change the law including speaking out against the government or
petitioning the government to change its policies. 18 This Article
addresses the deleterious impact that tax protestors’ unlawful actions can
have on compliant taxpayers and suggests a means by which that impact
can be overcome.
II. TAX COMPLIANCE
A high rate of tax compliance is essential to the operation of the
government. Without efficient collection of tax revenues, the government
cannot function. While most people comply with their tax obligations
with little resistance, not all people pay their taxes voluntarily or on time.
This Section discusses the scope of the problem of noncompliance, as
well as the reasons that have been proffered to explain both tax
compliance and tax noncompliance.
18. State initiatives have been very successful in limiting the ability of state governments to
raise taxes. In California, Proposition 13 limited the ability of the government to levy property taxes.
Tom Kenworthy, Colorado Wrestles with Proposal to Overhaul Tax Limits, USA TODAY Oct. 27,
2005, at A10. In Washington State, ballot measures have limited increases in government spending
and have reduced the taxes that could be collected for registering an automobile. See, e.g., Mark
Trahant, Is I-695 A Chance to Reshape Government, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at A2
(discussing in part the passage of I-695 which reduced the amount the state could charge for vehicle
licenses to $30); James L. McIntire, No Easy Answers in Choosing the Next Governor, Voters Must
Be Wary of Candidates with Simplistic Solutions to Balancing the Budget, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Sept. 15, 1996, at D1 (discussing I-601 which limited spending and tax increases).
In addition, angry citizens challenging taxes and government regulations are recurring themes in the
United States. Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 13, at 940; Thompson Smith, Note, The
Patriot Movement: Refreshing the Tree of Liberty with Fertilizer Bombs and the Blood of Martyrs,
32 VAL. U. L. REV. 269, 269 (1997).
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A. The Scope of the Tax Gap

All governments require a steady source of revenue, requiring
efficient tax collection. In times of budget deficits, effective tax
collection is even more important. Although tax compliance in the
United States is estimated to be between eighty and eighty-five
percent, 19 recent estimates of unpaid taxes put the amount at between
$312 and $353 billion each year. 20 This is the gross tax gap 21 and is
comprised of nonfiling, underreporting, and underpaying. 22 To compare,
the tax gap is approximately equal to the amount that the federal
government pays each year for Medicare 23 or the 2005 federal budget
deficit. 24 Examined another way, the tax gap increases the tax burden on
every compliant individual taxpayer by $2,000. 25
Enforcement efforts, including audits, liens, and levies, are used to
reduce the tax gap. In 2001, for example, the net tax gap, which is the
difference between the amount of tax owed and the amount of tax

19. Preliminary results from the National Research Program, the first effort to collect
taxpayer data since 1989, indicated that the 2001 voluntary compliance rate was approximately
eighty-five percent. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE’S REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2006
OBJECTIVES 6 (2005); see also Johnson, supra note 4, at 1015. However, others interpret the
preliminary results of the National Research Program to show compliance rate to be significantly
higher. Robert E. Brown & J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer
Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2003) (estimating ninety-eight
percent voluntary compliance on individual income tax returns in recent years). These discrepancies
demonstrate the difficultly in measuring compliance as adequate data is unavailable. Susan B. Long
& Judyth A. Swingen, Taxpayer Compliance: Setting New Agendas for Research, 25 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 637, 655 (1991).
20. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-38
(March 29, 2005); see also George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 1449
(2005) (discussing ways to close the tax gap).
21. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, supra note 20; Yin, supra note
20.
22. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, supra note 20. IRS National
Headquarters Office of Research, Tax Gap Map for Year 2001 (Feb. 24, 2004), cited in NATIONAL
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 211 (estimating the net tax
gap, the gross tax gap reduced by the amount ultimately collected, to be $255 billion a year).
Underreported tax liabilities account for eighty percent (approximately $249 to $311 billion) of the
gross tax gap. Id. at 214.
23. Yin, supra note 20, at 1449.
24. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, MONTHLY BUDGET REVIEW (October 6, 2005)
(concluding that the preliminary Fiscal Year 2005 federal budget deficit was $317 billion).
25. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, UNDERSTANDING TAX
REFORM: A GUIDE TO 21ST CENTURY ALTERNATIVES 6, 29 (2005) (citing the National Taxpayer
Advocate Service estimates, noting that there are approximately 130 million individual taxpayers).
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ultimately paid, was between $257 and $298 billion. 26 In light of
concerns about the current budget deficits and declining compliance,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson has pledged to
increase tax enforcement and tax compliance. 27
B. Factors Affecting Tax Compliance
1. Reasons for Tax Compliance
Notwithstanding the popular maxim that “taxes are what we pay for
a civilized society,” 28 most people would rather not give money to the
government. However, the federal income tax system in the United
States depends on “voluntary compliance.” 29 In fact, our system of
voluntary compliance does not mean that tax compliance is a matter of
choice. Rather, the filing of self-reported tax returns and the paying of
taxes is a “voluntary compulsion.” 30 That is, taxpayers are required to
report their income and tax owed rather than the government undertaking
the costly job of determining and collecting each taxpayer’s liability. 31
Attempting to determine each taxpayer’s liability without significant

26. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, supra note 20.
27. See, e.g., Closing the Tax Gap and the Impact on Small Businesses Before the H. Comm.
on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, Internal
Revenue
Service),
available
at
http://wwwc.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/
databaseDrivenHearingsSystem/displayTestimony.asp?hearingIdDateFormat=050427&testimonyId
=306 [hereinafter Everson Testimony]; Nina E. Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, has
expressed support for increased enforcement, but not at the expense of taxpayer services. Allen
Kenney, Déjà vu? Bush Wants $500 Million for IRS to Toughen Up in 2006, 106 TAX NOTES 747,
748 (2005).
28. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. George W. Dent, Jr., Race, Trust, Altruism and Reciprocity, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001,
1012 (2005) (noting the necessity of the tax system to rely on voluntary compliance because of the
costs of auditing large numbers of returns) (citations omitted); see also Michael G. Allingham &
Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 334 (1972);
Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Criminal Deterrence Literature: Implications for Research on
Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 126, 127
(Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989). In fact, the vast majority of all taxpayers pay their
taxes as required without incident.
30. Lederman, Interplay supra note 4, at 1455 n.6 (citing George Guttman, The Interplay of
Enforcement and Voluntary Compliance, 83 TAX NOTES 1683, 1685 (1999) (quoting former
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jerome Kurtz)); see also Jackson, supra note 13, at 318 (noting
the fact that tax protestor claims that they need not pay taxes is based on a mistaken interpretation of
the self-reporting nature of the tax system).
31. I.R.C. § 6001 (2000).
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cooperation from those who pay the tax would be prohibitively
expensive. Although the U.S. tax system is a very successful system of
voluntary compliance, 32 government officials agree that the compliance
rate is too low and may be declining. 33 In recent years, the IRS has
undertaken several initiatives to increase compliance. 34
An understanding of the motivations that lead to tax compliance is
important to understanding how to improve tax compliance. Economic
factors, legal consequences, social norms, and personal beliefs all
influence tax compliance. However, none of the studies of tax
compliance have been able to determine how to predict the causes of
compliance in a particular case. 35
From an economic perspective, an individual will likely comply with
the requirements of the tax laws if the expected cost of tax compliance is
less than the expected cost of noncompliance. 36 The expected cost of
noncompliance depends on the likelihood of detection, the size of
penalties available, and the nature of the penalties that may be imposed if
noncompliance is discovered. Given that the audit rate is currently less
than one percent 37 and penalties for noncompliance, which generally
range from twenty to seventy-five percent of the amount of the

32. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1520 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action and Law, 81 B.U.L. REV.
333, 341 (2001).
33. See Everson Testimony, supra note 27 (stating that according to data collected by the
National Research Program, in 2001 compliance was lower than in 1988, the last year for which
detailed compliance data was available); GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK
SERIES: AN UPDATE, GAO-05-207, at 37 (2005); Allen Kenney, Year In Review: Everson Evaluates
State of IRS, Pledges Strong Agenda for 2005, 106 TAX NOTES 40 (2004) (referring to
Commissioner Everson’s goal to increase collection); Marjorie Kornhauser, Doing the Fully Monty,
Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase Compliance, 107 TAX NOTES 999, 1002 (2005); Martin
A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Economic Cost of Bashing the IRS, 103 TAX NOTES 791
(2004); David Cay Johnston, Protestors Win a Case Over IRS, N.Y. TIMES June 24, 2005, at C1.
34. Written Testimony of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson Before Subcomm.
on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security, Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs (October 26, 2005), 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 207–
24.
35. See Joel Slemrod, Why People Pay Taxes: Introduction, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES:
TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, 2 (1992); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case
of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000).
36. See, e.g., Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4, at 1457.
37. In 2005, the audit rate for individual returns is about 0.9%, which is a 20% increase over
2004, and up from 0.49% in 2000. Allen Kenney, High-Income Audits Contribute to Record IRS
Enforcement Stats, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 213.
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underpayment, are not always imposed, economic analysis does not fully
explain the high rate of tax compliance in the United States. 38
The legal consequences of noncompliance may contribute to
taxpayers’ decisions to comply. These factors include the likelihood of
detection, the amount and nature of penalties (e.g., monetary or
criminal), the likelihood that severe penalties will be imposed, the cost of
compliance, and third party withholding and reporting. 39
Social norms and individual beliefs also influence tax compliance.
The important factors relating to norms include: age, education, personal
satisfaction with the government, perceptions that the tax system is fair,
occupation, opportunity to not comply, taxpayer attitudes and beliefs,
gender, and marital status. 40 In addition, taxpayers who believe that the
government does not spend money wisely or spends money on programs
with which the taxpayer disagrees are less likely to comply with their tax
obligations. 41 For instance, individuals who are over the age of sixtyfive, married, or in certain occupations are more likely to comply with
the tax laws than members of other groups. 42
Further, individual perceptions of the tax system strongly affect tax
compliance. The perceived fairness of the tax system is influenced by the

38. See Kornhauser, supra note 33 at 1000; Johnson, supra note 4 at 1013–14; GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE, GAO-05-207, at 37 (2005); Sullivan,
supra note 33; Kenney, supra note 33 (referring to Commissioner Everson’s goal to increase
collection).
39. See generally Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4; Long & Swingen, supra note 19, at
666; Slemrod, supra note 35; Loretta J. Stalans, Kent W. Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, When do We
Think About Detection? Structural Opportunity and Taxpaying Behavior, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
481 (1989) (considering the data gathered by the 1985 and 1988 Minnesota state department of
revenue studies); Robert Kidder and Craig McEwen, Taxpayer Behavior in Social Context: A
Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 47 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds) (1989); JAMES ALM, ET AL., THE
EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION AMONG TAXPAYERS ON COMPLIANCE, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04alm.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
40. See, e.g., Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 4, at 840.
41. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and
Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413; Robert Mason & Lyle D. Calvin,
Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 489, 489 (1984).
42. See, e.g., Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 4, at 840 (“Business filers in finance,
real estate, and insurance; agriculture, forestry, and fishing; and wholesale trade industries
understated taxes by the lowest percentages . . . .”); Jackson, supra note 13, at 295 (describing
converts to the protestor movement as generally being “conservative, middle-aged, white, Christian
males who possess an above average education, an above average salary, a past history of tax
compliance, and a growing dissatisfaction with government policies” (footnote omitted)); Chester N.
Mitchell, Willingness-To-Pay: Taxation and Tax Compliance, 15 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 127, 129
(1985).
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interaction of the government with taxpayers. This also may be
influenced by the government and the IRS’s treatment of tax protestors.
Because tax protestors vocally oppose what they believe to be unfair
treatment, they may influence perceptions on a large-scale basis.
Moreover, because taxpayer confidentiality is required by law, in many
cases the IRS will not have the means to effectively refute allegations of
unfair treatment. Taxpayer perceptions are also closely related to and
may be affected by other influences on tax compliance, which include
audit rates, publicity about successful tax avoidance schemes, penalties,
and social norms.
Audits affect taxpayers directly and indirectly. The audit directly
affects the taxpayer by determining the taxpayer’s correct tax liability.
Indirectly, the audit increases future compliance by both the taxpayer and
others who learn of the audit and its results. An audit may cause an
increase of self-reported income by many times the amount of the
adjustment proposed during the audit. 43 However, because audits are
costly to both the government and the taxpayer, only a small percentage
of returns are audited. 44 The low audit rate increases the odds of winning
the “audit lottery” and, to the extent the rate is generally known, may
decrease a taxpayer’s willingness to fully report his or her income.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the government will allocate significant
additional funding to tax enforcement, including increased audit or
collection efforts. 45

43. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1027 (stating that the audit may increase collection by up to
eleven times the amount of the adjustment); Brown & Mazur, supra note 19, at 1259; INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, ESTIMATING
THE IMPACTS OF TAX POLICY, ENFORCEMENT, AND IRS RESPONSIBENESS (2003) [hereinafter
DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE]; INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE,
ESTIMATING THE IMPACTS OF TAX POLICY, ENFORCEMENT, AND IRS RESPONSIVENESS 1 (1996);
Reducing the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal Fin. Mgmt., Gov’t Info., & Int’l
Sec. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. 11 (statement of Nina E.
Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate (audit adjustment may increase tax collection by six to twelve
times the proposed adjustment)); see also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 26, at 29 (citing Jeffery A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz & Lois L. Wilde,
The Effects of Audit Rates on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 395 (1990)). In
addition, although the IRS has estimated that for every additional dollar allocated to tax enforcement
it will collect over four dollars of tax due, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration has
questioned that estimate. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, A BETTER
MODEL IS NEEDED TO PROJECT THE RETURN ON ADDITIONAL INVESTMENTS IN TAX ENFORCEMENT,
TIGTA Ref. No. 2005-10-159 (2005), available at http://www.treas.gov/tiga/auditreports/
2205reports/200510159fr.html.
44. DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 43, at 1.
45. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1013–14.
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Studies show that people who believe the IRS will detect tax evasion
or underreporting are more likely to correctly report their income. 46 The
audit rate and the apparent risk of audit influence the perceived risk of
detection. 47 Risk of audit may be influenced by the positions, credits,
and deductions that a taxpayer reports. However, the factors used to
select a specific return for audit are generally unknown. In addition,
empirical research suggests that individual members of the general
population are more likely to overestimate rather than underestimate
their risk of audit. 48 Although taxpayers tend to overestimate their risk of
audit, publicity about very low audit rates may cause an individual
taxpayer to maintain a false belief that she is unlikely to be audited.
In addition, compliance is influenced by the likely consequences of
detection, 49 which include civil penalties, criminal sanctions, 50 and
social stigma. 51 The magnitude of sanctions that are likely to be imposed
also influence the effect on tax compliance. A small chance of a large
penalty, a large chance of a small penalty, or a large chance of a large
penalty may have different consequences for expected tax compliance.
Notwithstanding the availability of sanctions, in some cases there
will be little or no negative consequence from the tax avoidance, or the
imposition of the penalty may be delayed, even in well-known cases of
tax avoidance. For instance, despite a front-page story in the New York
Times in 2000 that Al Thompson, the owner of Cencal Aviation
Products, had decided not to withhold taxes from his employees because
he believed that he was not legally obligated to do so, the IRS did not
take any public action against Mr. Thompson until 2003. 52 During this
period, Mr. Thompson showed many others the means by which he
avoided taxes. 53 Although Mr. Thompson was ultimately convicted of

46. Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 1000; Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4, at 1464–65.
47. ALAN H. PLUMLEY, IRS NAT’L HEADQUARTERS OFFICE OF RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF
THE IRS ON VOLUNTARY TAX COMPLIANCE: PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS (Nov. 14–16,
2002) http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/irsvct/pdf.
48. Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 4, at 844.
49. See, e.g., Richard C. Stark, A Principled Approach to Collection and Accuracy-Related
Penalties, 91 TAX NOTES 115, 117 (2001). In studies conducted on individuals, people were more
likely to overestimate the likely cost of penalties if presented with data on likelihood of audit and
likely range of penalty separately.
50. See infra Part V.
51. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 49.
52. David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheat Sentenced to 6 Years for Defying I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2005, at C3. Thompson was not convicted and sentenced until 2005. Id.
53. Id.
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criminal conduct, his very visible and apparently successful tax
avoidance over a period of years could cause the public to underestimate
the likely consequences of tax avoidance. To some degree the steps taken
to collect taxes from vocal tax protestors may go unnoticed because of
the requirement that the IRS keep taxpayer information confidential. 54
Highly publicized examples like Al Thompson may contribute to an
impression that even though the IRS may impose criminal and civil
penalties for tax noncompliance, penalties are unlikely to outweigh the
benefit of noncompliance.
Perhaps fortunately, fines or imprisonment are not the sole sanction
that may result from tax noncompliance. Even if a taxpayer believes that
a penalty is unlikely to be imposed, the taxpayer may comply because
she anticipates that social stigma or feelings of guilt will be associated
with noncompliance. 55 Thus, social stigma associated with tax evasion
may increase compliance even if the economic benefit of tax
noncompliance will outweigh monetary penalties or criminal sanctions
associated with noncompliance. Similarly, the degree to which a
taxpayer believes he would feel guilt about cheating on his taxes may
influence compliance decisions. 56 Social stigma and feelings of guilt
may flow from a taxpayer’s belief in the legitimacy of the tax system and
its fairness. While very important to tax compliance, social stigma and
feelings of guilt are less easily quantified than monetary penalties.
In addition, taxpayers who believe that they are legally required to
pay taxes are more likely to comply with their tax obligations. 57
However, taxpayers, especially those who are dissatisfied with the
government or its policies, may be swayed by persuasive arguments
against the tax system. Nonetheless, the idea that the payment of taxes is
optional is an example of the adage that an idea that sounds too good to
be true probably is.
54. David Cay Johnson, U.S. Warning to Business on Tax Protest, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001,
at C1 (noting that although tax liens were filed, the liens were not discovered because the IRS used a
variation of the company’s name).
55. However, social stigma associated with noncompliance is likely to be minimized by the
fact that a taxpayer who is not accused of a criminal tax violation may avoid any public disclosure of
his or her tax noncompliance by settling the matter with the IRS without resort to court action. See
I.R.C. § 6103 (2000).
56. Stalans, Smith & Kinsey, supra note 39, at 499.
57. Posner, supra note 35; DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, supra
note 43 (1996). There is data available that suggests that overall taxpayers believe that it is wrong to
cheat on their taxes. IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2004 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY (reporting that
86% of the respondents in 2004, 81% in 2003, 86% in 2002, and 87% in 1999 indicated that no
amount of cheating on one’s income taxes was acceptable).
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Finally, the taxpayer’s belief regarding whether others do or do not
pay taxes can influence the taxpayer’s views on the necessity of tax
compliance. 58 Information on others’ tax compliance often comes from
media reports. Media reports on the increasing tax gap, successful tax
protestors, and tax avoidance schemes may create or increase the
perception that others successfully avoid paying taxes. 59 This perception
may cause otherwise honest taxpayers to be less likely to report and pay
their taxes because no one wants to be a “chump.” 60 This, in turn, may
cause a cascading effect. 61 The stronger the perception that others do not
pay taxes, the more likely an individual is to believe that he should not
pay taxes, which may make that individual more willing to cheat on his
taxes. 62
2. Reasons for noncompliance
Another element of taxpayer perception relates to whether the tax
system is viewed as being fair. An individual’s perceptions that the tax
system is unfair or treats similarly situated taxpayers differently may
reduce compliance. Visible noncompliance by tax protestors may reduce
general perceptions of tax fairness because the refusal to share in the cost
of public goods means that the tax protestors’ share of those costs must
be borne by other members of society. To the extent that such refusal to
pay and inaction by the government are known or publicized, general tax
compliance may decline because the majority may be unwilling to
support free-riding by tax protestors. 63

58. Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 1000; Lederman, Interplay, supra note 7, at 1470.
59. Stark, supra note 49, at 117. The reverse is also true. Reports of increased enforcement
activity or audit rate may increase compliance. See, e.g., Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4, at 1486–
87.
60. Stark, supra note 49, at 118; Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 87 (2003); Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4, at 1487.
61. See, e.g., Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 4, at 851.
62. This is borne out in commentary suggesting that the perception that it is okay to cheat on
taxes has been rising. See Curtis J. Berger, “Voluntary” Self-Assessment? The Unwilling Extraction
of Taxpayer Information, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 759, 759 & n.3 (1981); Johnson, supra note 4, at 1021.
See generally Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and
Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 378–80 (2002) (discussing how perceptions of cheating on
taxes affects compliance); Mitchell, supra note 42, at 131 (1985) (discussing how undetected tax
evasion encourages others to not comply).
63. See, e.g., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 217; Jon S. Davis, Gary Hecht & Jon D. Perkins, Social Behavior, Enforcement and Tax
Compliance Dynamics, 78 THE ACCT. REV. 39 (2003); Kahan, supra note 60, at 84 (“Auditing
crackdowns and other high-profile modes of enforcement risk backfiring, the evidence suggests,
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Notwithstanding the concern that tax protestors’ failure to pay their
share of taxes may harm the compliance rate, failure to provide an
effective, accessible means to redress disagreements about the
application of the tax laws can also make the tax system appear to be less
fair, and therefore, less legitimate. To promote the perception that the tax
system fairly addresses questions regarding individual liabilities, legal
challenges to tax determinations must be permitted. However, not all
challenges to individual tax liabilities or criticisms of the tax system are
legitimate. Nonetheless, it is essential to remember that even a tax
protestor can raise a legitimate claim that the law was misapplied in a
particular instance. Without looking to the merits of each case, it is
virtually impossible to determine with certainty that none of the claims
raised have any legitimacy. Summary rejection of suits or claims that
include typical tax protestor rhetoric, without at least some consideration
of the merits, can create the impression that access to justice is being
unfairly denied to some.
Thus, even though in most cases the resources used to process and
decide tax protestors’ claims could be devoted to more visibly productive
activities, their claims must be given some consideration to avoid
creating the perception that the tax system is unfair. Moreover, while
disregarding any group of taxpayers may undermine the perception of the
fairness of the tax system, tax protestors tend to be a vocal group and
may produce more publicity about their inability to challenge the laws.
This Article proposes, as explained in Part V, that tax protestors must be
permitted to express their views and must have access to the
administrative and judicial system, but such access must not be without
cost when it is used only to avoid or delay payment of a legitimate tax
liability.
Additionally, taxpayer confidentiality provides a challenge to
influencing taxpayer perceptions. The law prohibits the IRS and its
employees from disclosing individual taxpayer information. 64 This
prohibition hinders efforts to increase tax compliance by triggering social
stigma. Even when the IRS imposes penalties on a tax protestor, unless a
public record is created by the filing of a lien or a court case, information
about the identity of the taxpayer and penalties imposed is likely to be
protected against disclosure. Thus, tax protestors and tax scheme
because they function as a cue that evasion is widespread. . . . [Officials] should take advantage of
the attention that high-profile prosecutions naturally attract to publicize positive information . . . .”);
Lederman, Interplay, supra note 4.
64. I.R.C. § 6103 (2000).
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promoters have an advantage: they may very vocally and publicly claim
that the tax system is illegitimate and that they do not suffer
consequences for failing to pay taxes. Yet the Service cannot reveal what
it is doing with respect to individual tax protestors, or even whether
specific allegations are true. As a result, only nonspecific information
can be released. Thus, the incidence of detection of a particular evasion
technique and the magnitude of the penalty likely to be imposed may not
be well known. IRS Notices regarding transactions may increase public
awareness of government enforcement efforts, but such notices may not
be widely read outside the tax profession. Further, such notices may not
provide sufficiently concrete information to alert taxpayers as to the
likelihood that a particular approach to tax avoidance will be detected or
the likely consequences of detection. Moreover, such notices cannot refer
to individual taxpayers by name.
In addition, elected officials, politicians, and commentators
frequently challenge the fairness of the tax system. Because public
support of the tax system is essential to tax compliance, challenges to the
tax system made by politicians and officials may reduce tax compliance.
Recent examples of widely publicized challenges to the fairness of the
system of tax administration include the widely publicized hearings
conducted by the Senate Finance Committee in 1997 and 1998 65 and
political campaigns calling for the abolition of income tax or institution
of a “fairer” tax as a campaign platform issue. 66 Likewise, in recent
years, bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress calling for
the elimination of the Tax Code. 67
65. IRS Oversight: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998) (hearings
conducted on Apr. 28, 29. 30 and May 1, 1998); IRS Restructuring: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998) (hearings conducted on January 28. 29, and February 5, 11, and 25,
1998); Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 105th Cong. (1997) (hearings conducted on September 23, 24, and 25, 1997).
66. Steve Forbes challenged the current income tax system and the need for the IRS during
his presidential campaign. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, In New Hampshire, Forbes Works to Win the
Skeptics, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at A27. Steve Forbes recently wrote a book, again advocating a
flat tax and a postcard return as a means to eliminate the IRS. STEVE FORBES, FLAT TAX
REVOLUTION: USING A POSTCARD TO ABOLISH THE IRS (2005).
67. See S. 1921, 109th Cong. (2005) (stating that the purpose of the Act was “[t]o promote
freedom, fairness, and economic opportunity by repealing the income tax and other taxes, abolishing
the Internal Revenue Service, and replacing such taxes with a national sales tax and a business tax”);
Date Certain Tax Code Replacement Act, H.R. 278, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (“The purpose of this
Act is to set a date certain for replacing the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 with a simple and fair
alternative.”); Date Certain Tax Code Replacement Act, H.R. 4716, 107th Cong. (2002); Date
Certain Tax Code Replacement Act, H.R. 4199, 107th Cong. (2001); Date Certain Tax Code
Replacement Act, H.R. 4199, 106th Cong. (2000) (passing in the House and dying in the Senate);
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Much of the testimony during the 1997 and 1998 Senate hearings
questioned the integrity of the tax collection system. The hearings led to
the enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998 (RRA 1998) 68 At these hearings, testimony was taken from
priests, single mothers, business owners, and current and former IRS
employees, many of whom testified behind a screen to protect their
identity. 69 These hearings, investigating IRS activities, were televised,
widely discussed in the media, 70 and conducted in a “circus-like
atmosphere.” 71 Much of the testimony was later determined to be
erroneous. 72 However, despite the publicity of the hearings leading to an
outcry against the IRS, the subsequent discovery of inaccuracies was not
as widely discussed. 73 Such public challenges to the tax system, its
collection mechanisms, and the attention drawn to governmental
ineffectiveness at preventing tax avoidance may lead more individuals
and groups to question the fairness and validity of the tax system. 74
Increasing confidence in the fairness of the tax system may be
difficult. 75 The United States has a long history of tax revolts and tax
protests, which include the Boston Tea Party, the Whiskey Rebellion,
Shays’ Rebellion, the Second Whiskey Rebellion, and protests leading
Tax Code Termination Act of 1998, H.R. 3097, 105th Cong. (1998) (passing in the House with a
vote of 219 to 209, but dying in the Senate). The impetus for bills to repeal the income tax, to
eliminate the IRS, or to repeal the current tax code stem largely from frustration with the complexity
of the current law and a desire for reform. However, when viewed in isolation and from the
perspective of individuals looking for a way to justify their own noncompliance, these proposals
may provide the desired excuse for rejecting the tax system as unfair, abusive, or illegitimate. See
Kornhauser, Legitimacy, supra note 13, at 891–92 (discussing the images associated with and effects
of such proposals).
68. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of the
I.R.C.).
69. Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997).
70. Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 81 (2004).
71. Joe Spellman, Conference Panel Ponders Finance Hearing Horror Stories, 83 TAX
NOTES 1854, 1855 (1999) (quoting Cono R. Namorato of Caplin & Drysdale in Washington, D.C.).
72. See, e.g., Leslie Book, CDP and Collection: Perceptions and Misperceptions, 107 TAX
NOTES 487, 487 (2005); Camp, supra note 70, at 81; Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due?
I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 6330 Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51, 52 (2004).
73. See, e.g., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 457; Bryan T. Camp, Replacing CDP, 107 TAX NOTES 1039, 1039 (2005).
74. Kornhauser, Legitimacy, supra note 13, at 906.
75. See, e.g., CHARLES ADAMS, THOSE DIRTY ROTTEN TAXES: THE TAX REVOLTS THAT
BUILT AMERICA (1998) (explaining that America was built on a commitment to freedom from
taxation).
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up to the Civil War. 76 These incidents illustrate the historical importance
of tax protests in the United States, which some view as a component of
efforts to throw off the harness of government oppression. The freedom
and willingness to express concerns about the government and its actions
are important to a free society; however, there are important differences
between questioning the government and refusing to obey the law.
Because high tax compliance rates are essential to the effective
operation of the U.S. government, and because it is unlikely that
significant additional resources will be devoted to tax enforcement, the
government must maintain or even increase tax compliance through
other means. Enhancing the general perception that the tax system is fair
could encourage and possibly even increase tax compliance. The effect
might be further enhanced by publicizing the magnitude of penalties
imposed in cases where noncompliance is detected.
III. PROTESTOR RHETORIC
Although tax protestors are like others tax avoiders and evaders in
many respects, they differ from the norm in that they use a variety of
arguments to justify their refusal to pay any taxes. The belief that there is
legal justification for tax noncompliance distinguishes tax protestors
from other noncompliant taxpayers who either have made errors in
preparing their tax returns or have purposely violated the law.
This Section will analyze tax protestor arguments by discussing the
individuals and groups that embrace these arguments, and then providing
an overview of some of the most common constitutional and statutory
challenges they raise against the income tax.
A. Tax Protestors and Promoters of Tax Protest Approaches
Tax protestors come from all walks of life. Tax protestors are not just
lay individuals; they are often well educated. Among the prominent tax
protestors are accountants, 77 business owners, 78 former IRS
76. See, e.g., id.; Kornhauser, supra note 33.
77. See, e.g., Rotzinger v. United States, 165 F.3d 33 (7th Cir. 1998) (tax accountant
counseled clients not to report income); Stoecklin v. Comm’r 865 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1989)
(taxpayer had been a certified public accountant for many years).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Codner, 210 F.3d 390, (10th Cir. 2000); David Cay Johnston,
Mistrial Declared in Tax Withholding Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at C4 (discussing the case
of Richard M. Simkanin, owner of Arrow Custom Plastics, who stopped withholding taxes from his
employees in 2000); David Cay Johnston, Tax Protestor Is Convicted on 13 U.S. Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at C11 (explaining that Al Thomson, owner of Cencal Aviation Products, was
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employees, 79 chiropractors, 80 sheriff’s deputies, 81 and airline pilots. 82
On many occasions, protestor positions have been used by attorneys on
their own behalf and on behalf of their clients. 83
Tax protestors use books, live seminars, and the Internet to share and
promote their justifications for the nonpayment of taxes. 84 In addition,
the sale of tax protestor schemes can be profitable. Some tax protestors,
including organizations 85 and individuals, sell their ideas to others. For
instance, Thurston Paul Bell made $60,000 between 2000 and 2002 by
selling packages that explain his tax protestor theory on his websites,
www.nite.org and www.taxgate.com. 86 Similarly, Irwin Schiff has
written several books and sells his tax avoidance schemes on his website

convicted of tax evasion and other charges for failing to withhold and pay employment taxes on his
employees).
79. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Comm’r, 117 F. Supp 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the
report that Joseph Banister made to the IRS concerning his belief that the government could not
require the payment of taxes and that IRS procedures were unconstitutional; after making the report,
he resigned his position as an IRS Criminal Investigation Division agent).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Sather, 3 Fed. App’x. 725 (10th Cir. 2001) (chiropractor used
trusts to divert income based on belief that he was not subject to tax); David Cay Johnston, Hearing
Ordered on Claim that IRS Influenced Jury, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at C4 (discussing case of
Dr. Martin P. Rutherford).
81. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheat Sentenced to 6 Years for Defying I.R.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at C3 (referring to Matthew J. Allen, a Marin County, California deputy
sheriff and follower of former IRS CID agent Joseph Banister).
82. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); United States v. Engh, 330 F.3d
951 (7th Cir. 2003).
83. See, e.g., Roberts v. Comm’r, 329 F.3d 1224, 1229 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that although
the attorney was representing himself in this case, he had lost on the same issue in a previous suit
where he represented another taxpayer); United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 623 (10th Cir.
1990); Charczuk v. Comm’r, 771 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1985); Ficarola v. Comm’r, 751 F.2d 85, (2d
Cir. 1984); Takaba v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 285 (2002) (imposing penalties on both the attorney and the
taxpayer); Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 183, 187 (2001) (noting Thomas W. Roberts, the attorney
who had filed the petition, had raised such frivolous arguments before and had been disbarred from
practice before the court); Davis v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 35 (2000); Francis X. Sullivan, Comment, The
“Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority”: The Legal Theories of the Sovereign Citizen
Movement, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 785, 790 (citing Charczuk, 771 F.2d at 476).
84. See supra note 8.
85. Members of “We the People” have recently been successfully prosecuted for promoting
bogus tax schemes that promised to limit income tax liability. Press Release, U.S. Attorney, Cent.
Dist. of Cal., Several Tax Fraud Promoters Sentenced to Prison for Falsely Promising to Protect
Income
From
Taxes
(June
7,
2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/
pr2005/086.html. Another organization that has promoted tax protestor schemes is Morningstar
Consultants. United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2000).
86. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 475 (3d Cir. 2005).
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www.paynoincometax.com. 87 Schiff also owns a bookstore in Las Vegas
that sells his books and materials. 88
Publicity about efforts to stop tax protestors may make their
positions appear successful and legitimate, which might undermine other
taxpayers’ beliefs that everyone pays their fair share of taxes. In addition,
media attention may also make it easier for tax protestors to promote
their positions and convince others that their nonpayment is legitimate.
The Department of Justice has successfully undertaken criminal
prosecutions of many tax protest promoters 89 and has obtained
injunctions against the promotion of tax avoidance schemes. 90 These
efforts have not significantly slowed the growth of the tax protestor
movement. Promoters often challenge efforts to restrain the promotion of
their approaches to tax avoidance by challenging the issuance of
injunctions against selling tax avoidance schemes on First Amendment
grounds, 91 asserting that the scheme being promoted contains protected
political speech, that the injunction constitutes an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech, or both. 92 However, the courts reject these
contentions because courts can draw an injunction narrowly enough to
87. See United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 2004). The Department of Justice
has obtained an injunction preventing him from selling his most recent book. In addition, much to
the chagrin of his followers, in response to a civil suit brought by the Justice Department for $2.5
million in taxes, interest, and penalties, Mr. Schiff put forth the defense that he suffers from
delusions. Stanley Bing, Nuts to You!, FORTUNE, Mar. 8, 2004, at 218; David Cay Johnston, Tax
Protestor Tells Federal Court That He Is Delusional, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at C3 (noting that
Mr. Schiff, through his girlfriend and partner in promoting tax protestor materials, sent an email to
supporters alleging the claim of delusions was a ruse).
88. Schiff, 379 F.3d at 623.
89. Irwin Schiff has multiple convictions for avoidance and promotion of tax avoidance
schemes. See United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming a conviction for
attempted tax evasion and willful failure to file a corporate tax return); United States v. Schiff, 612
F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing conviction for willful failure to file an income tax return and
remanding to lower court on evidentiary issue). George H. Jesson was another tax protestor who
promoted tax avoidance and was later indicted and plead guilty to felony tax avoidance. Mr. Jesson
bragged in interviews about the things he was able to afford because he did not pay taxes. David Cay
Johnston, Tax Protestor Pleads Guilty to Filing False Claim, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at C2. He
and other businessmen who were featured as examples of the legality of avoidance by We the People
Foundation are serving prison terms. Id.
90. See, e.g., Schiff, 379 F.3d at 621; see also David Cay Johnston, Court Says Author Can’t
Sell His Book on Evading Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at C5; Court Blocks Antitax Book, 35
AM. LIBR., Oct. 2004 at 20.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 481–85 (3d Cir. 2005); Schiff, 379 F.3d at
621; United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000).
92. Bell, 414 F.3d at 478, 481 (arguing that an injunction was both an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech a violation of the right to free political speech); Schiff, 379 F.3d at 626 (arguing
that an injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech).
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prevent prior restraint or restriction of political speech. Furthermore,
courts have held that false commercial speech and statements designed to
aid and abet a violation of the tax law are not protected speech. 93
The protestors’ frivolous arguments take a variety of forms, which
are often summarily dismissed by the courts. 94 Many courts have
reasoned that more than summary dismissal might encourage other
people to use the protestor rhetoric to delay collection of their tax
liability. 95 For instance, after having considered the frivolous positions
in a number of cases, the Tax Court stated that the “time has arrived
when the Court should deal summarily and decisively with such cases
without engaging in scholarly discussion of the issues or attempting to
soothe the feelings of the petitioners by referring to the supposed
‘sincerity’ of their wildly espoused positions.” 96 Part B will discuss
some of the specific contentions that promoters and tax protestors have
advanced in furtherance of their efforts to avoid paying taxes.

93. Bell, 414 F.3d at 480–83.
94. See, e.g., Crain v. Comm’r, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984) (“We perceive no need
to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might
suggest that these arguments have some colorable merit.”); McCoy v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 1027, 1029–
30, aff’d 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The time has arrived when the Court should deal
summarily and decisively with such cases without engaging in scholarly discussion of the issues or
attempting to soothe the feelings of the petitioners by referring to the supposed ‘sincerity’ of their
wildly espoused positions”); Ketler v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1495 (1999) (following McCoy v.
Comm’r, 76 T.C. 1027, 1029–30 (1981)).
95. See, e.g., Stallard v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 993 (1992) (“[Taxpayer’s] arguments are
no more than stale tax protester contentions long dismissed summarily by this Court and all other
courts which have heard such contentions.”); Jackson v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 920 (1991)
(concluding after taxpayer filed both a petition and amended petition that raised only tax protestor
arguments that “no useful purpose would be served by affording the parties a further hearing in this
matter”); Havrilla v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 919 (1991) (“We see no reason to again refute these
arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent.”); Derksen v. Comm’r, 84 T.C.
355 (1985) (granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted
in either the petition or the amended petition). In other cases, the court has noted that had the Service
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, that dismissal likely would have been granted.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225 (1984); Phillips v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1223 (1984); Urban v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1130 (1984). These same claims have also
been raised in less traditional fora, such as the bankruptcy court, and summarily dismissed. See, e.g.,
Robnett v. United States, 165 B.R. 272, 274 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and imposing a $1,500
sanction on the debtor for raising only frivolous issues on appeal).
96. McCoy v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 1027, 1029–30, aff’d, 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983).
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B. Specific Tax Protestor Positions
1. Constitutional challenges
Tax protestors use a wide variety of arguments to support their
claims that they have no tax obligation or that the tax system is
illegitimate. Many of the contentions raised by tax protestors relate to the
constitutionality of the income tax. Constitutional challenges include
arguments that the income tax reporting rules violate the Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination, that the collection of taxes
is a taking without due process of law, that the creation of tax obligations
violates the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery, and that the
Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified. 97 Like other tax
protestor contentions, the courts have repeatedly rejected these and other
constitutional challenges to the income tax. 98
This Article does not reconsider tax protestor arguments in depth and
does not attempt to identify all of the types of tax protestor rhetoric
currently used. 99 However, this Article briefly describes a few of the
more common tax protestor arguments to provide a context for the
problems created by tax protestors.
One of the most enduring tax protestor contentions is the claim that
the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified. The ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment is challenged on several grounds. 100 The
challenges to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment are popular not
only among the tax protestors, 101 but also among the promoters of tax
protest schemes. 102 One claim argues that the ratification of the
97. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT FRIVOLOUS TAX ARGUMENTS
(2005), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv_tax.pdf [hereinafter THE TRUTH].
98. Id.
99. The Service published a fifty-six-page document, The Truth about Frivolous Tax
Arguments, in which the Service discusses a number of such arguments, explains why the arguments
are invalid, and identifies cases rejecting each position. Id. This document also identifies a number
of bogus claims for credits or deductions, one of which is the “slavery reparation” credit or refund,
which does not exist. Id.
100. The variations include claims that Ohio was not properly admitted as a state and therefore
President Taft was not president, meaning that he could not convene Congress, and the Secretary of
State whom the president appointed could not properly certify the ratification of the amendment. See
Knoblauch v. Comm’r, 749 F.2d 200, 201 (5th Cir. 1984); Jackson, supra note 13, at 301.
101. Jackson, supra note 13, at 301–07.
102. Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 240 (7th Cir. 1989) (expressing concern about the
number of taxpayers raising similar arguments, all based on a book, BILL BENSON & M.J. “RED”
BECKMAN, THE LAW THAT NEVER WAS (1986)).

1536

2CORDS.FIN.DOC

1515]

3/14/2006 5:16:09 PM

Tax Protestors and Penalties

Sixteenth Amendment was invalid because the Amendment’s language
was slightly different during some of the states’ ratification vote. 103 This
claim relies on a memorandum written by then Secretary of State Knox
outlining the differences, primarily spelling and grammatical errors. 104
The Solicitor of the Department of State concluded that the differences
between versions were immaterial. 105
Another argument against the Sixteenth Amendment’s ratification
posits that Ohio did not become a state until 1953; thus, Ohio was not a
state at the time of ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, and
President Taft was not properly President and could not convene
Congress. 106 This contention improperly uses Public Law 204, which
Congress passed in 1953 to settle a dispute as to the precise date in 1803
that Ohio became a state. 107 This argument is clearly erroneous because
the 1953 resolution did nothing more than confirm that Ohio became a
state in 1803. 108
Another common constitutional argument against the income tax is
that it violates the Fifth Amendment. 109 These challenges come in two
forms. The first variant argues that the income tax constitutes a taking by
government without due process of law. 110 However, because the
government cannot operate without revenue, it must collect taxes.
Moreover, because the means of collecting taxes must be efficient, the
courts have repeatedly allowed summary tax collection proceedings
where they were followed by an opportunity for judicial review. 111 The
second common contention relating to the Fifth Amendment is that
mandatory income reporting is a violation of a taxpayer’s right against
103. See, e.g., THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 24–26.
104. See, e.g., Miller, 868 F.2d at 240–41 (noting that these arguments are frivolous); Jackson,
supra note 13, at 301–07; BENSON & BECKMAN, supra note 102.
105. See, e.g., Miller, 868 F.2d at 240–41 (noting that these arguments are frivolous); Jackson,
supra note 13, at 301–03.
106. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 13, at 305; Johnson v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 22
(1979); Baker v. Comm’r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 307 (1978).
107. Jackson, supra note 13, at 305.
108. See, e.g., Bowman v. United States, 920 F.Supp. 623, 624 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
109. See, e.g., THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 21–23.
110. See, e.g., Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 832 (2d Cir. 1990); THE TRUTH supra
note 97, at 20–21; Jackson, supra note 13, at 307–08; Michael D. Riley, Comment, The Fifth
Amendment and Tax Protestors: Development and Present Status, 31 LOY. L. REV. 357 (1985).
111. Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931) (“Where, as here, adequate opportunity is
afforded for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure prompt
performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently sustained.”);
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1916); see also THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 2.
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self-incrimination. 112 However, the filing of a tax return is not, by itself,
an incriminating act. 113 Although in a particular instance, a taxpayer
might successfully challenge the requirement that she make a specific
disclosure on her tax return because that disclosure in and of itself would
be incriminating, simply filling out a tax return will not lead to criminal
sanctions. 114
Tax protestors have also invoked the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude. 115 This contention
asserts that income taxes require an individual to work for the benefit of
another, the government, without the individual’s consent. 116 However,
individuals are not required to work and tax is due only on income. Thus,
an individual is not involuntarily laboring for another. 117 Moreover, even
“if the requirements of the tax laws were to be classified as servitude,
they would not be the kind of involuntary servitude referred to in the
Thirteenth Amendment.” 118
Another popular tax protestor claim is that an individual is not a
citizen who is subject to the income tax. This argument is based on the
contention that the taxpayer is not a United States citizen but is instead
the citizen of a state, a natural and freeborn person, or a nonresident
alien. 119 This position often involves an assertion that the payment of
income taxes is required only of federal employees and residents of the
District of Columbia. 120 Tax protestors further reason that if they are not
112. Tax protestors often assert a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination; such risk of incrimination does not exist in most cases, although in limited cases
disclosure of the source or amount of income or other specific information could be incriminating.
See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 41–42 (1968) (allowing a taxpayer to make a
claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment where the filing of the return would by itself be
incriminating); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 263–64 (1927) (concluding that although there
may be cases where completion of a return will constitute self-incrimination that would entitle the
taxpayer to “plead the Fifth,” a blanket assertion of privilege was not available); United States v.
Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1311 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding that a taxpayer or a tax protestor did not
have a right under the Fifth Amendment to not report income that was earned in an illegal activity);
Jackson, supra note 13, at 308–09; Riley, supra note 110.
113. See, e.g., Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 264; United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1240–41 (9th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1979); see also THE TRUTH, supra note
97, at 22–23.
114. Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 274.
115. See, e.g., THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 22–23.
116. Id. at 23–24; Jackson, supra note 13, at 310.
117. Jackson, supra note 13, at 310.
118. Porth v. Brodick, 214 F.2d 925, 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
119. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 13, at 310.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000).
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citizens of the United States, they are not subject to the income tax.
Some variants of this position require an individual to renounce all ties to
the government and declare her status as a sovereign citizen. 121
However, there is no legitimate distinction between state citizenship and
federal citizenship for tax purposes.
Some protestors argue that the income tax violates equal protection
because it treats married taxpayers and single taxpayers differently. 122
Courts have rejected this argument as the income tax does not affect any
fundamental rights or any suspect class of citizens. 123 These examples
demonstrate some, but not all, of the frivolous claims that tax protestors
raise relating to the validity and applicability of the income tax.
2. Other challenges
One of the most popular arguments that does not involve the
Constitution is the argument that paying income tax is voluntary. 124
People asserting this position have misconstrued the description of our
tax system as “voluntary” to mean that the payment of tax is “optional,”
which the courts have concluded is clearly incorrect. 125
Tax protestors also assert that wages are not income because they
result from the individual’s labor. 126 They argue that the value of the
labor provided is equal to the amount of money received and therefore
the laborer has no gain and, consequently, no tax liability. 127
Some protestors challenge the IRS’s authority to collect taxes,
claiming that the IRS is not really a government agency. 128 These
taxpayers claim that the IRS is a Delaware corporation without the legal
121. THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 1–4 (discussing Jonathan D. Luman’s “Tax Buster”
program).
122. Jackson, supra note 13, at 309–10.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 1–4; United States v. Marsh, 144 F.3d 1229,
1231 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1299–1300 (5th Cir. 1991); see also
Jackson, supra note 13, at 318 (noting the fact that tax protestor claims that they need not pay taxes
is based on a mistaken interpretation of the self-reporting nature of the tax system).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825, 840–41 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding
that the trial court had not erred by instructing the jury that “voluntary” was not the same as
“optional”).
126. The courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g., Barnett, 945 F.2d at 1298.
127. See generally Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); THE TRUTH, supra
note 97, at 7–11; Jackson, supra note 13, at 314; John W. Wright, Note, Taxation: Frivolous Tax
Litigation: Pecuniary Sanctions against Taxpayers and Their Attorneys, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 156,
156–57 (1986).
128. Jackson, supra note 13, at 313–14.
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ability to collect taxes. 129 This argument clearly fails, however, because
the Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to create the IRS and to
delegate to the IRS the power to enforce the tax laws. 130
Additionally, protestors claim that Federal Reserve notes are not
legal tender because they cannot be redeemed for gold or silver, 131
despite the delegation in the Constitution to Congress to establish legal
tender. 132 These protestors argue that when they are paid with Federal
Reserve Notes they do not receive “real money” for their labor and,
therefore, they have no income that can be taxed. 133 The tax protestors
asserting this position claim that the currency became worthless when the
United States moved off of the gold standard. 134 In addition, tax
protestors reason that if there is no legal tender, they cannot be liable for
a tax debt denominated in such a currency. 135
Finally, a very common tax protestor claim is referred to as “the
section 861 position.” 136 This argument looks to the language of I.R.C.
section 861 through 865, and uses the language of those sections as the
basis for a contention that wages and other earnings received by U.S.
citizens in the U.S. are not income. 137 However, these are sourcing rules,
used only to determine whether income is U.S. or foreign source
income. 138 This position has been repeatedly rejected as frivolous. 139
In addition, taxpayers who object to funding the military on moral,
religious, or philosophical grounds have attempted to withhold payment
of all or part of their taxes. 140 Such taxpayers generally claim a credit or
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting this
argument); Wright, supra note 127, at 157.
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
133. See Zuger v. United States, 834 F.2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987); United States v.
Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Condo, 741 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1980).
134. Condo, 741 F.2d at 238.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
136. Rev. Rul. 2004-30, 2004-1 C.B. 622 (discussing the so-called “section 861 position” and
the possible civil and criminal penalties available to taxpayers asserting this position to deny their
tax liability).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See e.g., id.; United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2005); Takaba v. Comm’r, 119
T.C. 18 (2002).
140. See, e.g., Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 174–75 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the
taxpayer’s willingness to pay her taxes if they would be placed in a fund that did not pay for military
spending, paying for which violated her religious beliefs, or if the government would otherwise
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refund of the amount that they believe is attributable to the war effort. 141
Because the Constitution grants Congress the power to collect taxes and
use revenues for the general good, courts have rejected taxpayers’ refusal
to comply with the tax laws on moral, religious, or philosophical
grounds. 142
As the sample of arguments discussed in this section has
demonstrated, the arguments used by tax protestors are extremely varied.
The one thing that all tax protestor arguments have in common is that
they are frivolous. However, because tax protestors often use an
amalgamation of these arguments with their filings or in their court
filings, it may be difficult to identify whether a particular case includes
legitimate claims along with the frivolous rhetoric. To provide a context
within which to understand the need for a penalty equal to the costs
associated with collection of tax from a tax protestor be imposed on tax
protestors, it is first necessary to understand the opportunities available
to taxpayers to challenge their tax liability. This context is important to
clarify why tax protestors cannot be simply shut out of the system and
how tax protestors impose significant costs on the government. The next
Section discusses the tax collection process and the rights afforded to
taxpayers during the collection process.
IV. TAX COLLECTION AND TAXPAYER COLLECTION RIGHTS
This Section provides a brief description of the tax collection and
review process. This Section also provides a framework for
understanding potential costs and the need for penalties to compensate
for abuse of the tax system. Part A discusses tax collection generally.
Part B discusses some of the new taxpayer rights created by Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998). 143
A. Tax Collection Generally
There are three primary parts to the tax collection process: (1)
determination of the tax liability, (2) payment of the tax liability, and (3)
accommodate her beliefs); see also THE TRUTH, supra note 97, at 13–14 (explaining protestors’ use
of the rationale that there can be no tax imposed in an invalid currency); Kornhauser, supra note 13,
at 943 (distinguishing conscientious tax protestors from tax protestors who do not have a moral
objection, just a monetary objection, to paying taxes).
141. Wright, supra note 127, at 160.
142. Id. at 161 (citations omitted).
143. Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of 26
U.S.C.).
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challenge of the tax liability, which in some cases may occur before
payment. At each stage, taxpayers have an opportunity to interact with
the IRS and often with the courts. Thus, there are several opportunities
for a taxpayer with legitimate concerns or challenges to an asserted tax
liability to present her concerns or challenges and to arrive at a
resolution. As a result, those who want to delay or frustrate the tax
collection system also have numerous opportunities to do so, which can
be very costly to the tax collection system and the courts.
1. Determination of tax liability
Tax liabilities may be determined in two ways: (1) self-reporting and
(2) IRS determination. The Service determines tax liabilities by
conducting audits, 144 by matching self-reported returns with information
returns, 145 and by identifying errors on filed returns. 146 With third-party
information statements, the Service can match the amount reported by
the payee to the amount reported by the payor to determine whether the
taxpayer has properly reported taxable income. 147 Mandatory
withholding and third-party information reporting eliminate the
opportunity for most taxpayers to underreport their income without

144. An audit may be conducted in several ways. First, an audit may be conducted by
correspondence, with the Service requesting that the taxpayer provide documentation to the auditor
by mail. Second, an audit may be conducted in the local IRS office. Third, an audit may be
conducted at the taxpayer’s residence or place of business. Finally, as in the case of many large
corporations, the audit may be continuous and conducted on an ongoing basis at the taxpayer’s place
of business, by on-site IRS personnel. In addition, an audit of a taxpayer’s liability may be either
partial (examining only some of the taxpayer’s reported items) or complete (examining the
taxpayer’s entire return). Audits are generally performed by examiners or auditors who work for the
IRS in the examination division. See generally, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL (CCH), pt. 4, available at http://www.irs.gov./irm/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005)
[hereinafter IRM].
145. Examples of information returns filed by third parties include Form W-2 Wage
Statements, issued to employees by employers; and Forms 1099, which are issued by a variety of
payors to payees of items such as interest, pensions, miscellaneous items, etc.
146. Such determination may result from a math error adjustment, I.R.C. §§ 6201, 6213
(2000), or from a determination on audit.
147. Some problems with matching have occurred. For instance, the Service temporarily
discontinued a program that matched partnership items reported on a Form K-1 with items that are
reported on the partner’s tax return because of reported errors and problems with accurate matching.
The “bugs” in this program had to be worked out, after which the program was restarted.
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detection. 148 Even for taxpayers subject to withholding or third-party
information reporting, a self-reported return must be filed. 149
The Service may examine or audit a filed return regardless of
whether there is a reported balance due. Based on the audit, the Service
may determine that the taxpayer correctly reported, overreported, or
underreported her tax liability. Audits have a positive effect on tax
compliance but are costly and time consuming. 150 Currently less than
one percent of all returns are audited. 151
Taxpayers not subject to mandatory withholding, including domestic
business entities, self-employed persons, and sole proprietorships, are
those most likely to underreport their income. 152 Estimates suggest that
approximately eighty percent of the tax gap is attributable to
underreporting. 153 Thus, the majority of enforcement resources available
should be used to detect underreporting among taxpayers not subject to
mandatory withholding. 154
2. Payment of tax liability
After the tax liability is determined, the tax due must be paid.
Payment may already have occurred as a result of mandatory
withholding or the payment of tax deposits. In fact, tax compliance
begins and ends with a self-reported return for most wage earners and
taxpayers whose income is subject to information reporting and
withholding because there is little opportunity to underreport or avoid
payment. 155

148. See supra note 4.
149. This is also often referred to as self-assessment, although that term is misleading. An
assessment does not occur until it is made by the IRS. I.R.C. § 6201 (2000). See Camp, supra note
73, at 1551 (commenting on the inaccuracy of casual references to self-assessment and the
confusions such references may cause).
150. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 4.
153. Id.
154. In 2002, 174,585,000 returns were filed. IRS REPORT TO CONGRESS: IRS TAX
COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES (July 2003). Also in 2002, the IRS made a total of 15,873,290 compliance
contacts—13,315,765; 1,449,139; 242,637; and 823,749 contacts related to math error,
underreporting, automated substitute returns, and examination, respectively. Id.
155. See, e.g., Stalans, Smith & Kinsey, supra note 39, at 502 (concluding that not only do
these taxpayers have greater opportunity to avoid taxes but also they are more likely to be involved
in groups that are more accepting of tax avoidance, i.e., groups that have “less stringent norms
against tax cheating”).
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In other cases, a taxpayer’s liabilities are not satisfied through
withholding or tax deposits. Payment for any remaining liability is due at
the time the taxpayer’s tax return is due, without extensions.
However, some taxpayers do not pay their taxes at the time of filing.
In these cases, the Service assesses the reported amount due. After
assessment, the IRS may begin collection actions, which first require the
Service to give notice of the unpaid liability and make a demand for
payment. 156 Although a lien arises automatically for unpaid taxes, 157 to
obtain priority over other creditors, the Service must file a Notice of
Federal Tax Lien. 158 In addition, the Service may pursue collection by
seizing or levying on the taxpayer’s property. 159
3. Challenge of tax liability
When the Service determines that additional amounts are due, the
taxpayer sometimes has an opportunity to challenge the determination
administratively and judicially before assessment. 160 After assessment,
the taxpayer can pay the tax and request a refund, an administrative or
judicial process. 161
The opportunity to challenge a tax liability is not limited to
challenges to IRS determinations of additional amounts due. Even
taxpayers who self-report a liability or fail to challenge the determination
of a deficiency have at least one opportunity to challenge. Taxpayers in
the United States are entitled to more opportunities to challenge the
amount of tax due than those of any other country. 162 First, after
156. I.R.C. § 6303 (2000).
157. Id. § 6321.
158. Id. § 6323.
159. Id. § 6331. Prior to levy, a notice of intent to levy must generally be provided thirty days
in advance. Id. In addition, the taxpayer must be given notice of the taxpayer’s right to a Collection
Due Process Hearing. Id. § 6330. This right is discussed below. See supra Part IV.B.1. Additional
protections shield some property from levy. Id. § 6334. In addition, approval is required before the
Service can collect by levy on a principal residence. Id. § 6334(e).
160. A judicial challenge is not available in all instances. I.R.C. § 6213 provides jurisdiction in
the Tax Court only for deficiency redeterminations in income, estate, gift, and certain excise tax
cases.
161. I.R.C. § 6523.
162. Although no proposal has ever been made to eliminate all judicial review and is unlikely
to be seriously considered, it is unclear whether refund jurisdiction is constitutionally required for
tax liabilities. See Harold Dubroff & Dan S. Grossman, The United States Tax Court: An Historical
Analysis, Part VI, 42 ALB. L. REV. 191, 210 n.166 (1977) (citing Rockwell v. United States, 512
F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975)). No proposal has even been made to do this, and it would seem contrary to
the United States’ history of requiring process in tax collection.
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payment of the liability, a taxpayer requesting a refund is entitled to
consideration of the request and if the request is denied or is not
answered within six months, the taxpayer may file suit in the United
States District Court or the Court of Federal Claims. 163
Another opportunity for judicial review may exist when the Service
pursues collection of an unpaid liability. After a Notice of Federal Tax
Lien or issuance of a Notice of Intent to Levy is filed, the taxpayer is
entitled to challenge the collection action and, sometimes, the underlying
liability, during a collection due process (CDP) hearing, which
culminates in an opportunity for judicial review. 164 This right is
discussed in the next Part.
In addition, even if the taxpayer is not at a stage where she is entitled
to judicial review, there may be opportunities to challenge the liability
administratively. Administrative challenges may involve discussions
with a revenue officer or an auditor, appeal to the IRS employee’s
manager, or consideration by the IRS Office of Appeals. 165
All taxpayers are given access to these processes. In most instances
taxpayers are not required to raise or avoid particular arguments to gain
access to review. However, the issues that may be raised are not
unlimited. For instance, statute of limitations may limit the years that
may be considered by a court. 166 In addition, the court’s jurisdiction may
163. The taxpayer is also entitled to judicial review if the taxpayer does not receive an
administrative response to the refund claim within six months. Id. § 6532.
164. I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330.
165. See IRM, supra note 144, at 8.1.1.2.2. The issues that the Appeals Office may consider
include determinations of income, estate, gift, employment and excise taxes; liabilities and additions
to tax and penalties; collection due process; offers-in-compromise; abatement of interest;
administrative costs under I.R.C. § 7430; jeopardy levies; and recommendations concerning
settlement offers in refund suits. Id.; see also MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE ¶ 9.03[2] (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005). The IRS Office of Appeals is an independent
department of the IRS, which is designed to address concerns raised by taxpayers about the actions
taken by other IRS offices. IRM, supra note 144, § 8.1.1.1. The Appeals Office’s mission begins,
The Appeals mission is to resolve tax controversies, without litigation, on a basis which
is fair and impartial to both the Government and the taxpayer and in a manner that will
enhance voluntary compliance and public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the
Service. The Appeals program is designed to effectively carry out the Appeals mission.
Id. at 8.1.1.1.2. The independence of the Appeals Office was statutorily confirmed by RRA 1998, §
1001(a)(4). See generally H.R. REP. NO. 105-599 (1998) (Conf. Rep.); SALTZMAN, supra, ¶ 9.01, at
9-5 (“In the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 . . . the Office of Appeals was not only
acknowledged, but its independence was required to be protected.”). Ex parte communications
occurring after October 23, 2000 between the Appeals Officer and other IRS employees are limited.
Rev. Proc. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 404.
166. In most cases, the statute of limitations prevents assessment of a liability more than three
years after the date on which the return was filed. I.R.C. § 6501(a). One important exception to this
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be limited. 167 Finally, in a few instances, a statute may limit the issues
that can be considered at an administrative proceeding. 168
An additional limitation may be imposed when a particular taxpayer
has repeatedly raised an argument that the courts have found to be
without merit. In these cases, courts sometimes enjoin a taxpayer from
bringing another action against the IRS or its employees until the
taxpayer demonstrates that he is not raising the same frivolous
arguments. 169 However, this is an extreme remedy that is not often
imposed.
The number of opportunities to dispute a tax liability with the IRS
and in court provide ample opportunity to ensure that the right amount of
tax is collected. However, tax protestors may use the number of available
opportunities to their advantage. These opportunities can be used to slow
the collection process and are costly in terms of both the resources
needed to pursue collection from intransigent taxpayers and the unpaid
tax liability.
Notwithstanding the possibility that these processes can be abused,
their availability is important to voluntary compliance. It would be easy,
and often is tempting, to bar people who raise time-worn, repeatedly
rejected, frivolous tax protestor claims from accessing the administrative
and judicial systems. 170 Barring a particular group of taxpayers from
challenging tax liabilities could harm the perception of the fairness of the
tax system. First, in some cases legitimate issues could be buried in the
tax protestor rhetoric. Because of this, simply dismissing the claims out
of hand would likely increase both real and perceived unfairness.

rule applies in cases of an omission of more than twenty-five percent of the gross income that should
have been stated on the return, which will allow up to six years for the Service to make an
assessment. I.R.C. § 6501(e). Moreover, if no return is filed, a false return is filed, or the taxpayer
willfully attempts to defeat or evade the tax, an assessment may be made at any time. I.R.C. §
6501(c).
167. The Tax Court’s jurisdiction is limited. See I.R.C. §§ 6213, 7442. Moreover, the district
court and court of claims have jurisdiction only in refund requests and CDP appeals where the Tax
Court would not have jurisdiction over the underlying liability. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(2).
168. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6330(c) (limiting the issues that can be raised in a CDP hearing); id. §
6404 (limiting the review of a denied request for abatement of interest to whether the IRS abused its
discretion).
169. I.R.C. § 7421 (barring suits to prevent or restrain the assessment or collection of tax).
170. Recently, one court said that simply wishing to raise only frivolous tax-protestor
arguments was not a valid reason to deny a CDP hearing. Hinman v. Grzesiowski, No. 3:05-CV-049
RM (N.D. Ind. May 10, 2005). But see Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 183 (2001) (concluding that it
was unnecessary to remand a case back to the Appeals Office even though no hearing had been
conducted because to do so would be “neither necessary or productive”).
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Second, barring some issues would present the challenge of determining
which issues should be precluded and could create a fear that particular
groups, rather than ideas, were being barred from access to relief. This
could lead to a concern that people who are less pleasant to deal with
might be barred access to the system. Finally, because tax protestors tend
to be a vocal group, they would likely widely broadcast their exclusion
from the system. This could signal to compliant taxpayers the possibility
of exclusion, and the confidentiality of taxpayer information would
prevent the Service from adequately answering charges that such
exclusions were unfair. Many taxpayers, unaware of the strict nature of
the legal prohibition against disclosure of taxpayer information by the
Service, could interpret the Service’s silence as a tacit admission that the
tax protestors’ allegations have merit. As a result, such silence could be
deleterious to voluntary tax compliance.
The belief that the IRS acts unfairly in collecting taxes also affects
the perceived fairness of the tax system. Concerns about the Service’s
collection practices were brought to the forefront in the Senate Finance
Committee hearings conducted in 1997 and 1998. 171 The next Part
discusses the changes to taxpayer rights and the tax collection system as
a result of these hearings. Additional rights provide additional
opportunities for tax protestors to avoid payment and increase the cost to
the government of pursuing collection of taxes from tax protestors.
B. Some Changes in Taxpayer Rights Resulting from RRA 1998
After the 1997 and 1998 hearings, Congress enacted RRA 1998. 172
RRA 1998 was intended to combat the IRS abuses that were alleged
during the hearings. However, concerns about the means used to collect
taxes are certainly not new. Moreover, considering that over 130 million
individual tax returns along with many other tax returns are filed each
year, such concerns are inevitable; no matter how hard any agency that
works with so many people tries, errors will occur. RRA 1998 made
some necessary and some unnecessary or ineffective changes to the tax

171. Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Serv.: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997). These hearings were convened on September 23–25, 1997.
Hearings on “IRS Restructuring” were held on January 28–29 and February 5, 11, and 25, 1998. IRS
Restructuring: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 1 (1998). Hearings on “IRS
Oversight” were held on April 28–May 1, 1998. IRS Oversight: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 105th Cong. 1 (1998).
172. Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended in various sections of 26
U.S.C.).
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collection system, including the creation of collection due process rights
and the prohibition against designating a taxpayer to be an illegal tax
protestor. These changes are discussed below.
1. Collection Due Process
One of the new taxpayer rights created by RRA 1998 was the right to
a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. 173 CDP hearings are conducted
by an impartial appeals officer 174 when a CDP hearing is requested
within thirty days of the issuance of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien 175 or a
Notice of Intent to Levy. 176 Except in limited cases, a timely request for
a CDP hearing stops a levy during the administrative and judicial
processes. 177 While CDP is an important right, and judicial review is a
necessary component, it is also subject to abuse. Tax protestors in
particular may use CDP as a means of delaying tax collection and
frustrating their obligation to timely pay their share of the cost of
government.
During a CDP hearing, the appeals officer verifies the tax assessment
and the Service’s compliance with the applicable laws, considers
collection alternatives, and balances the need for efficient collection
against the taxpayer’s interests. 178 The appeals officer then issues a
notice of determination stating whether collection may proceed. 179 If the
taxpayer is not satisfied with the determination, the taxpayer may seek
judicial review, which is generally conducted to determine whether the
appeals officer abused her discretion. 180
The availability of CDP hearings and review may cause the public to
perceive the system as being fairer. That perception would be consistent

173. I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2000).
174. Id. § 6330(b)(3).
175. Id. § 6320(a).
176. Id. § 6330(a)(3), (b). There is a right to a CDP hearing when either event occurs.
177. Levy is not precluded if tax is in jeopardy. Id. § 6330. Levy may also occur during a
judicial appeal if the underlying liability is not at issue and the IRS shows good cause for collection
to proceed. Id. § 6330.
178. Id. § 6330(c)(2). In cases where a notice of deficiency was not issued and there was no
prior opportunity to challenge the underlying liability, the taxpayer may also challenge the
underlying liability at the CDP hearing. Id. § 6330(c)(2)(B).
179. Id. § 6330(c)(3).
180. Id. § 6330(d). Appeal is to the Tax Court if it would have jurisdiction over the underlying
liability and to the district court if the Tax Court would not have jurisdiction over the underlying
liability. Review of a challenge to the underlying liability, if permitted by I.R.C. section 6330, is de
novo.
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with Congress’ intent, which was expressed in the committee report as
follows:
The Committee believes that taxpayers are entitled to protections
in dealing with the IRS that are similar to those they would have
in dealing with any other creditor. Accordingly, the Committee
believes that the IRS should afford taxpayers adequate notice of
collection activity and a meaningful hearing before the IRS
deprives them of their property. . . . The Committee believes that
following procedures designed to afford taxpayers due process in
collections will increase fairness to taxpayers. 181
However, some have argued that CDP is a waste of resources that is
potentially, if not actually, harmful to taxpayers. 182 If the taxpayer has
multiple tax liabilities but has sought a CDP hearing and review of only
selected tax liabilities, the taxpayer’s assets will not actually be protected
because the bar on levy that results from the CDP hearing request will
halt collection only of the particular years’, period, and tax liabilities that
are the subject of that CDP notice. 183 However, many taxpayers who
seek a CDP hearing will not have unpaid liabilities relating to years that
are not included in the CDP notice, or for which the time to request a
CDP hearing has expired.
Further, CDP requires the use of significant judicial and
administrative resources. 184 The examination and collection functions
participate in the CDP hearing, which the appeals office conducts. If the
taxpayer appeals a CDP determination, the Service or the Department of
Justice attorneys will have to answer the petition, prepare or respond to
motions and, in some cases, prepare for and conduct a trial. Judicial
resources used include the time spent on motions and trials. 185
Although many CDP cases are resolved at the appeals office level,
those that are appealed to the courts disproportionately involve frivolous

181. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67 (1998).
182. Camp, supra note 73.
183. Id. Camp notes that once the house is gone, it does not really matter whether it was taken
to pay the taxes for year X or for year Y; the effect is the same.
184. Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of CDP, Part 2: Why It Adds No Value, 104 Tax Notes
1567, 1570–72 (2004).
185. Chief Counsel defends the Service in cases heard by the United States Tax Court. The
United States Department of Justice defends the Treasury Department and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue in cases brought in the United States district courts and in the United States Court
of Federal Claims.
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tax-protestor claims. 186 Thus, in the CDP context, the consumption of
administrative and judicial resources by frivolous positions remains a
particularly important concern. 187 The number of litigated CDP cases
that involved frivolous issues dropped from fifty percent in 2003 to
twenty-three percent in 2005; however, this level is still too high. 188
Some believe that the proper response to such a high rate of frivolous
claims (and other problems with CDP) is to eliminate judicial review of
CDP. 189
This conclusion is inadequate because it fails to acknowledge the
benefits that CDP and judicial review of the CDP determination provide
to tax administration. First, taxpayers may be able to successfully
negotiate mutually satisfactory resolutions by working with a different
representative of the Service, the appeals officer. 190 Many tax collection
issues are resolved in the appeals office during the CDP hearing; most
CDP cases do not involve judicial review. 191 As noted by the National
Taxpayer Advocate in her 2004 Annual Report to Congress, “[t]hese
safety valves make taxpayers feel that the tax system is, after all,
ultimately fair and balanced.” 192 However, judicial review is a necessary
component of CDP. The availability of judicial review not only provides
assurances that the Appeals Office will properly perform its functions,
but it likely increases the perceived fairness of the process. 193
Just as with other aspects of tax collection, tax protestors cannot be
barred from using CDP without adversely impacting general perceptions
of fairness. Therefore, a solution short of shutting tax protestors out of
the system is needed. As discussed below, this can be done by requiring

186. Camp, supra note 73. Only about five percent of the CDP hearing requests raise frivolous
claims; however, those claims account for a disproportionate amount of resources and appeals.
STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 2003 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION
RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND
RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, appendix 1, 22–23 (JCX-53-03).
187. Camp, supra note 73, at 1047.
188. Id. (citing the 2004 Annual Report of the National Taxpayer Advocate).
189. Id.; Danshera Cords, Reforming, Not Replacing, CDP, 108 TAX NOTES 817 (2005).
190. I.R.C. §6330(c) (2000); see also Cords, supra note 189, at 818.
191. Some practitioners have reported that it is often easier to establish an installment
agreement or an offer in comprise when working with an Appeals Officer than when working with a
revenue officer. These practitioners often seek to move the collection process along to the issuance
of the CDP notice.
192. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
Preface at vii (2004).
193. Cords, supra note 189, at 821–22.

1550

2CORDS.FIN.DOC

1515]

3/14/2006 5:16:09 PM

Tax Protestors and Penalties

people raising only tax protestor positions to pay for the cost of those
challenges at both the administrative and judicial level.
2. Illegal tax protestor designation
Another concern raised during the 1997 and 1998 Senate hearings
was a concern that the IRS’s practice of labeling some taxpayers as
“Illegal Tax Protestors,” or ITPs, created stigma for taxpayers. 194 There
were also concerns that after a taxpayer was identified as an ITP, the
designation might remain, even if the taxpayer subsequently came into
compliance. 195 As a result of this concern, RRA 1998 bars the IRS from
designating a taxpayer as an illegal tax protestor. 196 As required by
section 3707 of RRA 1998, the IRS has expended significant effort to
eliminate all references to illegal tax protestors in the Internal Revenue
Manual, employee training, and taxpayer master files. 197
However well-intentioned banning the use of the ITP label was, it
may frustrate efficient tax administration. In addition, this is another
example of a reaction to a concern expressed during the hearings that
may impede the IRS’s ability to collect taxes from some taxpayers. Such
a designation can provide important information to tax collectors. It
identifies the types of arguments that are likely to be presented and
allows tax officials to prepare for the likely responses to collection
efforts. In addition, section 3707’s bar of the “ITP” designation simply
means that different, possibly less accurate or informative labels, are
used. Instead of identifying tax protestors or tax protestor arguments, the
IRS now identifies the much broader categories of abusive tax schemes
or scams. 198 The tax schemes and scams that are identified include those

194.
195.
196.
197.

S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 105 (1998).
Id.
RRA 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3707, 112 Stat. 685, 778 (1998) (uncodified).
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, FISCAL YEAR 2005
STATUTORY AUDIT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL GUIDELINES PROHIBITING THE USE OF ILLEGAL
TAX PROTESTER AND SIMILAR DESIGNATIONS, REP. NO. 2005-40-104 (2005). In its most recent
report on IRS compliance with section 3707 of RRA 1998, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration concluded that the IRS was largely in compliance. Id. The report identified only 309
instances in which it found references to illegal tax protestors. Id. at 2. Primarily these references
were made in case narratives prepared by IRS personnel. Id.
198. On its web site, the IRS has a page devoted to links that help a taxpayer identify “tax
scams.” http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=106788,00.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2005). Included in the information available is a fifty-six-page document, The Truth About Frivolous
Tax Arguments, supra note 97. The IRS also changed the designation of the taxpayers. See, e.g., IRS
Fact Sheet 2005-15, IRS Obtains More Than 100 Injunctions Against Tax Scheme Promoters (Apr.
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that would have resulted in an ITP designation before RRA 1998 as well
as other aggressive positions such as tax shelters.
Even assuming that banning the ITP label addresses a real problem,
lumping tax protestors and tax shelters together may reduce the IRS’s
ability to target enforcement resources effectively. An effective means of
pursuing collection from a tax protestor may not be as effective to collect
a tax liability from someone who purchased a tax shelter and vice versa.
Barring the Service from using the ITP designation is an incomplete
solution. In addition, the courts are not impacted by section 3707.
Because they are not prevented from using the ITP designation, courts
continue to apply this label. 199 This leads to inconsistent descriptions of
the same behavior.
Prohibiting the IRS from identifying some taxpayers as tax protestors
does not promote effective tax administration, as it does nothing to stop
their arguments or bring them into compliance. On the other hand, this
prohibition may make it harder to identify and efficiently interact with
tax protestors. More effective means of addressing the concerns of
stigma or the possibility of an unreasonable refusal to remove an ITP
designation are needed.
As tax collection relates to tax protestors, RRA 1998 may make it
even harder to ensure collection. However, because perceptions of
fairness are critical to tax administration, such rights may be necessary,
and exclusion of tax protestors as a group would be ill advised.
Therefore, a means of recovering from tax protestors the additional cost
of collection that stems from their illegal acts is necessary.
V. TAX PENALTIES
This Section will first consider the justifications for the imposition of
penalties. Next, it will look at the types of tax penalties that are currently
available. The Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between additions to
tax 200 and penalties; 201 however, both are relevant in this context and
will collectively be referred to as penalties. Although the focus of this
2005),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0,,id=137831,00.html.
199. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 475 (3rd Cir. 2005); Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363,
365 (5th Cir. 2005).
200. I.R.C. §§ 6651–6658 (2000).
201. Id. §§ 6662–6663 (discussing accuracy and fraud-related penalties); Id. §§ 6671–6720
(discussing assessable penalties); Id. §§ 6721–6723 (relating to penalties for failure to provide
information reports).
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Article is on civil penalties imposed on frivolous claims, this does not
suggest that civil and criminal penalties are, or should be, mutually
exclusive. Both criminal and civil penalties can be imposed on a single
act, 202 and civil penalties are often used in conjunction with criminal
sanctions. 203
This Section provides background for the Article’s proposal that
additional penalties need to be imposed on tax protestors, despite the fact
that penalties do not appear to deter tax protestors’ behavior. Such
penalties are needed to reimburse the government’s costs of collection
and to provide a fair result to both compliant taxpayers and tax
protestors.
A. Justifications for the Imposition of Tax Penalties
Some commentators have suggested that lower compliance may
result if penalties are too high, 204 while other commentators have
suggested that current penalties are adequate to deal with both tax
protestors and their attorneys. 205 However, the appropriate level of
penalty depends on the reason for imposing penalties and how those
penalties interact with the tax administration system.
Tax penalties address a variety of tax noncompliance situations.
Possible justifications for imposing penalties include deterrence,
punishment, and reimbursement or compensation for the costs imposed
on or incurred by the government. Although most tax penalties are
intended to deter tax avoidance, 206 remediation and compensation have
also been used to explain the imposition of civil tax penalties. 207 The
Supreme Court has stated,
202. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (“Congress may impose both a criminal
and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits
merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.”).
However, civil penalties can only be added to criminal sanctions if the civil penalties are remedial
rather than deterrent or retributive in nature. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 437, 449 (1989).
203. See, e.g., Badarraco v. United States, 464 U.S. 386, 396 (1984).
204. See, e.g., Lederman, Interplay, supra note 24, at 1485 (questioning Professor Kahan’s
conclusion that high penalties might reduce compliance).
205. Wright, supra note 127.
206. See, e.g., Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399 (1938) (“To ensure full and honest disclosure, to
discourage fraudulent attempts to evade the tax, Congress imposes sanctions. Such sanctions may
confessedly be either criminal or civil.”); Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties—“They Shoot
Dogs Don’t They?”, 43 FLA. L. REV. 811, 857–63 (1991); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (noting that deterrence and retribution are traditional reasons for
punishment in criminal cases).
207. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401.
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The remedial character of sanctions imposing additions to tax has been
made clear by this Court in passing upon similar legislation. They are
provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and
to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation
and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s fraud. 208

Criminal sanctions, which have a much higher standard of proof and
may result in incarceration, are less frequently imposed, but nonetheless
have a significant deterrent effect. 209 Criminal penalties may be imposed
for certain types of willful tax avoidance. 210 Civil penalties are imposed
more frequently but their deterrent effect may be less than that of
criminal penalties. More important in deterring tax noncompliance are a
taxpayer’s internalized norms regarding the importance of tax
compliance. 211
The penalties that are frequently used against tax protestors,
including the frivolous filing penalty 212 and the frivolous litigation
position penalty in the Tax Court, 213 may be relatively small compared
to the resources needed to pursue collection. In addition, monetary
penalties may not deter the tax avoidance behavior of tax protestors.

208. Id.
209. Stark, supra note 49, at 117 (noting that jail is a consequence that many are unwilling to
risk).
210. I.R.C. § 7201 (2000) (making it a felony to willfully evade or defeat tax); id. § 7202
(making it a felony to willfully fail to collect or pay over tax); id. § 7206 (making it a felony to
commit fraud or make false statements); id. § 7207 (making it a crime to willfully file a fraudulent
return or file a false statement); id. § 7212 (making it a crime to attempt to interfere with the
administration of the tax laws by forcible interference or forcible rescue of seized property).
211. Stark, supra note 49, at 119; Stalans, Smith & Kinsey, supra note 39, at 482.
212. I.R.C. § 6702 (2000) (imposing a $500 penalty on returns filed that do not contain
information allowing determination of the correctness of a self-assessment or that on its face is
incorrect and is based on frivolous positions or a desire to delay or impede tax administration).
213. Id. § 6673 (allowing the Tax Court to impose a penalty of up to $25,000 against a
taxpayer who litigates a position solely for delay). Other civil penalties are also available. Id. §
6651(a)(2) (imposing a civil penalty for failure to pay tax due); id. § 6654 (imposing a civil penalty
on an individual for failure to pay estimated taxes); id. § 6656 (imposing a penalty for failure to
make required tax deposits); id. § 6662 (imposing a penalty on underpayments); id. § 6663
(imposing a penalty on underpayments attributable to fraud); id. § 6672 (imposing a penalty for
failure to collect and pay over tax or attempting to evade tax); id. § 6682 (imposing a penalty of
$500 for each false statement an individual makes with respect to withholding); id. § 6700 (imposing
a penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters); id. § 6701 (imposing a penalty for aiding and abetting
the understatement of a tax liability); id. § 6702 (imposing a penalty for the filing of a frivolous tax
return); id. § 6704 (imposing a penalty for failure to maintain the required tax records); id. § 6721
(imposing a penalty for failure to file correct information returns); id. § 6722 (imposing a penalty for
failure to provide correct payee statements); id. § 6723 (imposing a penalty for failure to comply
with other information reporting requirements). Criminal sanctions are also available.
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Some people will engage in disobedient behavior even though there is a
strong likelihood of being fined. For instance, people have engaged in
war protests, even when they knew that there would be a fine for failure
to obtain a proper permit. They still protest because they believe that
their message is more important than the possible sanction. 214
B. Civil Penalties Assessed by the IRS for Frivolous Positions
There are several civil penalties that the Service may assess against
taxpayers. One penalty frequently assessed against tax protestors is the
frivolous return penalty, which authorizes the Service to impose a $500
penalty when a return is filed that:
(A) does not contain information on which the substantial
correctness of the self-assessment may be judged, or
(B) contains information that on its face indicates that the selfassessment is substantially incorrect; and
(2) the conduct referred to . . . is due to—
(A) a position that is frivolous, or
(B) a desire (which appears on the purported return) to delay or
impede the administration of Federal income tax laws. 215

The Service often imposes the frivolous return penalty when
taxpayers file zero returns, indicating that they have no taxable income
and are entitled to a refund of any tax withheld. 216 Congress enacted this
penalty because of its concern about increasing numbers of tax
protestors. 217
214. See, e.g., Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the denial of a march
permit where the applicant had not satisfied the requirement to agree not to engage in civil
disobedience in the days following the Rodney King verdict and dismissing the claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act and a Bivens claim resulting from the demonstrators arrest). See generally
Robert P. Lawry, Ethics in the Shadow of the Law: The Political Obligation of a Citizen, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 655 (2002) (discussing the moral obligation of an individual in light of unjust or
unethical laws).
215. Id. § 6702(a).
216. See, e.g., Ray v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (2003); see also I.R.M. 20.1.10.9;
Turner v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 412 (2004).
217. S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 74, 277 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1023–25.
The Senate Finance Committee report indicates the following:
The committee is concerned with the rapid growth in deliberate defiance of the tax laws
by tax protestors. The Internal Revenue Service had 13,600 illegal protest returns under
examination as of June 30, 1981. Many of these protestors are induced to file protest
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Unlike most other current civil tax penalties, the frivolous return
penalty can be imposed in addition to other penalties. 218 Because it does
not adequately deter the assertion of frivolous positions, 219 proposals
have been introduced during recent Congressional sessions that would
increase the frivolous return penalty to $5,000. 220 Another proposal
would impose a $5,000 penalty on frivolous submissions. 221 The
proposals do not go far enough.
Another penalty often applied to tax protestors’ returns is the
accuracy-related penalty of I.R.C. section 6662. This is a twenty percent
penalty that is imposed when there is an understatement of tax on a
return that is due to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, or a
substantial understatement of tax. 222 A substantial understatement is an
understatement of more than ten percent of the tax or $5,000. 223 A
taxpayer is not subject to the accuracy-related penalty if the taxpayer can
establish that he or she had reasonable cause for the understatement and
acted in good faith. 224
In more egregious cases of underreported tax liability, a civil fraud
penalty may be imposed. The civil fraud penalty is a seventy-five percent
penalty applied to the portion of the underpayment that is attributable to
fraud. 225 Imposition of the fraud penalty requires a much higher level of
culpability than does imposition of the negligence or substantial
understatement penalty; it requires proof of intent to evade tax. 226
returns through the criminal conduct of others. These advisors frequently emphasize the
lack of any penalty when sufficient tax has been withheld from wages and encourage
others to play the “audit lottery.” The committee believes that an immediately assessable
penalty on the filing of protest returns will help deter the filing of such returns, and will
demonstrate the determination of the Congress to maintain the integrity of the income tax
system.
Id.
218. I.R.C. § 6702(b).
219. Many tax protestors repeatedly file tax returns taking frivolous positions, despite the
imposition of the frivolous return penalty on each return. See, e.g., Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d
517 (7th Cir. 1984).
220. See, e.g., United States Tax Court Modernization Act, S. 661, 109th Cong. (2005).
221. Tax Relief Act of 2005, S. 2020, § 523, 109th Cong. (2005). This penalty would apply to
frivolous submissions in CDP and Offers in Compromise, among other areas. Id.
222. I.R.C. § 6662(a).
223. Id. § 6662(d). The accuracy related penalty is not available for substantial understatement
if the taxpayer had substantial authority for the position or the position was disclosed on the tax
return. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
224. Id. § 6664(c).
225. Id. § 6663(a).
226. SALTZMAN, supra note 165, ¶ 7B.02.
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Another difference between the civil fraud penalty and other civil
penalties is that the Service bears the burden of proof. 227
In addition to the penalties that may be imposed on a taxpayer for her
return positions, penalties can be imposed on promoters of frivolous
positions. A $1,000 penalty per document may be imposed against a
person
(1) who aids or assists in, procures, or advises with respect to, the
preparation or presentation of any portion of a return, affidavit, claim,
or other document,
(2) who knows (or has reason to believe) that such portion will be used
in connection with any material matter arising under the internal
revenue laws, and
(3) who knows that such portion (if so used) would result in an
understatement of the liability for tax of another person. 228

In addition to the penalties that can be asserted by the Service, as
discussed below, the courts can also assert a number of penalties against
taxpayers who take frivolous positions and use the judicial system to
delay collection of their taxes.
C. Civil Penalties Imposed by the Courts
Courts can impose penalties on vexatious litigants, including tax
protestors, pursuant to statutory authority, judicial rule, and the court’s
inherent powers. Even courts of limited jurisdiction, such as the Tax
Court, have inherent power to impose sanctions on frivolous litigants. 229
The inherent power to impose sanctions promotes “the due and orderly
administration of justice and [maintains] the authority and dignity of the
court.” 230 Although it is not a common remedy, courts can charge a
frivolous litigant for the costs incurred by her opponent when the
litigation was instituted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.” 231

227. Id.
228. I.R.C. § 6701.
229. Charczuk v. Comm’r, 771 F.2d 471, 475 (10th Cir. 1985).
230. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quoting Cooke v. United States,
267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925)).
231. Id. at 766 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 129 (1974)).
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The courts are often understandably reluctant to impose penalties on
pro se litigants. However, many courts have overcome this reluctance in
the case of tax protestors because of the burden they place on the
courts. 232 Many courts have warned current and future litigants that
certain positions will be penalized in future cases. 233 Unfortunately, the
willingness to impose penalties does not address the problem of
inconsistent application.
1. The Tax Court
The Tax Court is authorized to impose a penalty of up to $25,000 on
taxpayers
(1) Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that―
(A) proceedings before it have been instituted or maintained by the
taxpayer primarily for delay,
(B) the taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or
groundless, or
(C) the taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue available
administrative remedies 234

These penalties have been regularly imposed on tax protestors. 235
Before imposing a section 6673(a) sanction in a particular context, the
Tax Court often warns future litigants that it will impose penalties. 236
232. See, e.g., Parker v. Comm’r 117 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1997) (imposing the requested
$2,000 sanction after stating that “[a]lthough some latitude may be afforded to pro se taxpayers who
misunderstand the nature of the tax laws, pro se status is not a license to litter the dockets of the
federal courts with allegations that the Internal Revenue Code is the product of an illegal
conspiracy.”); Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 242 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district
court’s imposition of sanctions and imposing more for a the filing of a frivolous appeal); Connor v.
Comm’r, 770 F.2d 17, 20 (2nd Cir. 1985) (imposing Rule 38 sanctions); Depew v. United States, 50
F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D. Colo. 1999); Birth v. United States, 782 F. Supp. 289, 292 (M.D. Pa. 1992)
(imposing $3,000 in Rule 11 sanctions).
233. See, e.g., Marino v. Brown, 357 F.3d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting a prior warning and
issuing a further warning); Roat v. Comm’r, 847 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1988); Zuger v. United
States, 834 F.2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lefebvre v. Comm’r, 830 F.2d 417, 421 (1st Cir.
1987) (warning future pro se litigants against making the same arguments); Steward v. Comm’r, 90
T.C.M. (CCH) 269 (2005) (warning specifically directed to taxpayer against future frivolous
arguments).
234. I.R.C. § 6673(a) (2000).
235. See, e.g., Keene v. Comm’r, 121 T.C. 8 (2003); Nestor v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 162 (2002).
236. Pierson v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000) (warning future CDP litigants of the
availability of section 6673(a) penalties). Copies of Pierson have been provided to many taxpayers
pursuing CDP claims and asserting tax protestor positions.
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Even when a court dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction, the court can
impose penalties, 237 which may be important when a tax protestor
institutes proceedings for purposes of delay.
While this penalty is substantial, it is discretionary in both
application and amount. Such discretion means that similarly situated
taxpayers may ultimately receive different results. More uniform
application could increase the perception of fairness.
2. The district courts and federal court of claims
The penalty for frivolous litigation available under I.R.C. section
6673(a)(1) is limited to imposition by the Tax Court. This means that the
district courts are left solely with their inherent power and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 to sanction intransigent taxpayers. Because many
tax protestors are pro se litigants, the courts may be hesitant to impose
Rule 11 sanctions. This is particularly the case where the government
fails to ask the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions. 238 As with I.R.C.
section 6673 penalties, Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed even if a case
is later dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 239
It is important that the district courts and the federal court of claims
have the ability to impose significant penalties on tax protestors even
though these courts’ jurisdiction over tax litigation is generally limited to
refund jurisdiction. In addition to refund claims, tax protestors often file
suit in district courts when the IRS asserts a deficiency, 240 claiming that
the United States Tax Court is not a legitimate court. The burden on the
judicial system is also increased by claims filed by tax protestors seeking
to enjoin tax collection, which are often filed despite the Anti-Injunction
Act’s prohibition against such suits. 241

237. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992).
238. See, e.g., Lindsey v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2257 (D. Nev. 2003) (upholding
determination to proceed with collection of frivolous return penalties and granting the requested
$1,242 in attorneys fees as a sanction under the court’s inherent power, but noting that a $2,500
sanction would have been appropriate); Carrillo v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1608 (D. Nev.
2003); Waller v. United States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6759 (D. Nev. 2002); Blanchard v. United
States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6640 (D. Nev. 2002). In many cases before the district courts, the IRS
has not asked the court to impose sanctions on a taxpayer who has only sought delay or raised
frivolous arguments.
239. See Willy, 503 U.S. at 132.
240. See, e.g., Purk v. I.R.S., 1990 WL 10692 (6th Cir. 1990).
241. See, e.g., Hezel v. United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-6405 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Because I.R.C. section 6673(a)(1) penalties cannot be imposed by
the district courts or the court of claims, 242 the amount and nature of the
penalties imposed by the court may depend on whether a taxpayer brings
a prepayment suit in the Tax Court or a refund claim in the district court
or court of claims. Since the jurisdiction of these courts is not
coextensive, this difference in treatment, based entirely on the court in
which the case is brought, may result in the perception that taxpayers are
treated differently. This may seem unfair to some taxpayers.
3. The courts of appeals
By statute, the courts of appeals can impose sanctions on litigants
and attorneys. 243 The party losing an appeal may be required to pay “just
damages” and single or double costs resulting from the delay. 244 An
additional statute provides that
[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct. 245
Both statutes have been used against tax protestors. 246
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 allows the court of appeals
to impose sanctions on litigants who bring frivolous appeals. These
sanctions are often imposed on tax protestors. 247 Although in some cases

242. I.R.C. section 6673 has limited application outside the Tax Court. Other courts may
assess an I.R.C. section 6673 penalty of up to $10,000 only for frivolous or groundless proceedings
under I.R.C. section 7433, which permits actions for certain unauthorized collection actions. I.R.C. §
6673(b)(1) (2000).
243. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1927 (2000).
244. Id. § 1912.
245. Id. § 1927.
246. See, e.g., Raft v. Comm’r, 95 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-2652 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 and FED. R. APP. P. 38 to impose sanctions on the attorney in a tax protestor case);
Sawukaytis v. Comm’r, 102 Fed. Appx. 29 (6th Cir. 2005) (granting sanctions against a tax protestor
under 28 U.S.C. § 1912, even after noting the desire to use sanction sparingly to avoid chilling
possibly meritorious appeals); Marino v. Brown, 357 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2004) (imposing sanctions
on a tax protestor under 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and FED. R. APP. P. 38); Stoecklin v. United States, 865
F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1989) (imposing sanction against a tax protestor under 28 U.S.C. § 1912).
247. See, e.g., Stafford v. United States, 208 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2000) (awarding the
government $4,000 in sanctions against a tax protestor); United States v. Ins. Consultants of Knox,
Inc., 187 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 1999) (ordering $2,000 sanction against tax protestor and corporation for
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the courts of appeals have been willing to impose significant sanctions,
including attorneys fees awards on taxpayers whose entire arguments are
based on tax-protestor rhetoric, 248 the amount of the sanction is likely to
be low compared to the cost to the system resulting from a frivolous
appeal.
Even more troubling is the fact that the amounts are likely to be
inconsistent from one tax protestor to the next and from one circuit to
another, depending on nothing more than the court or judges before
which the case is presented. Sanctions are discretionary, and therefore,
the court of appeals is not required to impose sanctions in any particular
case. 249 Although there may be less willingness on the part of the courts
of appeals to impose penalties because tax protestors often represent
themselves, the courts of appeals have imposed sanction in tax protestor
cases with some frequency. 250
D. Effect of Penalties on Tax Protestor Behavior
There is little data on the effect that civil penalties generally have on
tax compliance. 251 However, case after case demonstrates that the
current penalties do not deter the tax-protestor arguments. That the
current penalties do not adequately deter tax protestors is demonstrated
by the fact some tax protestors engage in multiple litigations, undeterred
by prior failed litigation. 252 Even summary disposition of these cases
imposes significant systemic cost.
In addition to the imposition of penalties, the IRS and the
Department of Justice have a number of initiatives designed to slow the
which protestor served as an officer unless they could show cause why such a sanction should not be
imposed).
248. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 766 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) (awarding the
IRS attorneys fees and double costs).
249. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3984.1 (3d ed. 2005).
250. Id.
251. See Stark, supra note 49, at 116.
252. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 239 (1989) (noting that this was an
appeal from previous challenges brought by the same taxpayer that raised the same tax protestor
arguments relating to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, despite the prior imposition of
sanctions); Wright v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1990) (noting that the same taxpayer had
brought the same frivolous tax protestor claims to the Tax Court on four prior occasions, in each of
which the Tax Court awarded the government $5,000 damages under I.R.C. section 6673);
Trohimovich v. Comm’r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1109 (1989) (referencing Trohimovich v. Comm’r, 776
F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1985), which states that the taxpayers had “filed at least fifteen tax-related appeals
in this court since July, 1979”); see also Trohimovich v. Comm’r 77 T.C. 252 (1981).
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growth of the tax protestor movement. One approach uses judicial action
against the promoters of tax protestor schemes. Sanctions against
promoters include civil remedies (primarily injunctions) and criminal
charges. 253 Injunctions have been successful in preventing specific
individuals from promoting abusive tax schemes. 254 Between 2001 and
April, 2005, the IRS obtained over 100 injunctions against promoters of
illegal tax schemes. 255
Another approach is education. The Service is using a number of
methods to educate the public about illegal tax schemes, such as making
a variety of resources available on the IRS website 256 and appealing to
the media and other public outlets. However, such efforts have not
sufficiently reduced the number of illegal tax schemes or tax protestor
filings. Therefore, additional mechanisms and initiatives to reduce the
spread of illegal tax schemes and the promotion of tax protestor rhetoric
are needed.
VI. PENALTIES AS SYSTEMIC COMPENSATION
A. The Costs and the Problem
As has been demonstrated, conventional approaches do not stop tax
protestors from delaying tax collection and tying up the courts. 257
Neither civil penalties nor criminal prosecution have slowed the growth
of the tax protestor movement. Moreover, penalties are often imposed
inconsistently. A different approach is needed to compensate the system
for the costs imposed by tax protestors’ frivolous arguments and to deter
others from converting to the tax protestor movement. In addition, the
justification of deterring such behavior as the reason to impose penalties
253. Criminal indictments in 2005 against promoters of tax scams are up fifty-seven percent.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Notes Increase in Tax Enforcement (April 26,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv05167.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
254. Monica Langley, Consultant Leads Secret Double Life as Internet Sleuth, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 10, 2004, at A1 (discussing the role of an individual in ferreting out tax protestor schemes and
the role she played in calling into question Irwin Schiff’s insanity defense).
255. Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, FS 2005-15, IRS Obtains More Than 100
Injunctions
Against
Tax
Scheme
Promoters
(April
2005),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=137831,00.html. Because of increased efforts to prevent
the promotion of tax scams, in 2004 the number of indictments against promoters of illegal tax
schemes increased fifty-seven percent over the prior year. Id.
256. See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Scams—How to Recognize and Avoid Them,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=106788,00.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
257. See supra Part IV.D.
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does not stand up to the evidence that the current penalties do not
adequately deter. However, care must be taken to avoid signaling that
others may ignore their tax obligation without consequence, which might
reduce the incentive to comply with tax obligations. 258 As the Tax Court
has noted, “[B]y filing cases of this type, the protesters add to the
caseload of the Court . . . and such cases increase the expenses of
conducting this Court and the operations of the IRS, which expenses
must eventually be borne by all of us.” 259
To effectively deter tax protestor behavior without reducing
incentive to comply with tax obligations, when costs are incurred
because an individual is pursuing a truly frivolous and repeatedly
rejected position, the costs should be borne by the person who caused
them. Compliant taxpayers should not bear the costs of protestors’
refusal to pay tax; this may make the system appear less fair and cause
some currently compliant taxpayer to stop complying. As the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “When the legal system depends on
honest compliance as much as the income tax system does—and when
disobedience is potentially rewarding to those affected by the rule—it is
often necessary to impose steep penalties on those who refuse to
comply.” 260 Penalties should be imposed on tax protestors who make
frivolous arguments, not only to punish them but also to compensate for
the damage their actions cause to the tax system and its public
perception. Before examining this proposal in depth, consider the
following costs associated with the tax protestor movement.
Systemic costs resulting from tax protestor tactics include the use of
IRS collection and litigation resources and the diversion of attention
from legitimate issues of tax administration. IRS resources are used to
identify, pursue, and often litigate cases against taxpayers raising
frivolous positions; thus, the IRS is prevented from directing those
resources to identify tax shelters, find tax evaders, and properly
administer the tax laws. Furthermore, cases that are litigated in the
district courts also require the involvement of the Department of Justice.
When tax protestors litigate, judicial resources are diverted from
legitimate cases, causing delays in justice for litigants in legitimate cases.
In the Tax Court, this delay means that the delayed taxpayers with a

258. Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 1000.
259. Pierson v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000) (quoting Hatfield v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 895,
899 (1977)).
260. Coleman v. Comm’r, 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986).
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colorable claim will be subject to greater interest accruals. 261 The district
courts, which have refund jurisdiction in tax cases, 262 also have
jurisdiction over a wide variety of civil and criminal cases. Time taken
by tax protestors prevents the courts from expeditiously deciding other
cases. This is unfair to criminal defendants and can be costly to civil
litigants.
Although the cost of the use of judicial, IRS, and Department of
Justice personnel can be reduced to a monetary value, not all costs can be
measured in dollars. For instance, it is impossible to determine the cost to
other litigants whose cases may be indirectly delayed as a result of the
pursuit of frivolous claims by others. However, this is a common
problem in compensating victims for wrongs—money is often an
imperfect measure of damages, but it is often the only measure available.
Tax protestors impose enormous costs on the tax system, and their
behavior is not deterred by current penalties. As previously noted, two
similar tax protestors may be penalized differently; such inconsistent
consequences result in horizontal inequity, and this inequity may cause
other taxpayers to question the fairness of the system. In addition, current
penalties do not compensate the system for the costs imposed by the tax
protestors.
B. Penalizing Protestors for Costs to the Tax System
To increase the equality of treatment and improve the systemic
results, a penalty should be imposed on tax protestors in the amount of
the costs that they cause. These may include costs of administrative
proceedings at the appeals office, time spent by the IRS or Department of
Justice attorneys in preparing and trying cases in the Tax Court or district
court and the court of appeals, and less tangible harm to other taxpayers.
Moreover, because many tax protestors are pro se litigants, which makes
courts uncomfortable with imposing heavy penalties, such penalties
should be mandatory as long as the taxpayer raises an issue that is
identified as a frivolous tax protestor argument.
A reasonable solution to the problem associated with tax protestors
and the costs that they impose on the government, the courts, and the
261. A taxpayer may stop the running of interest by making a deposit to the Treasury prior to
assessment of the tax. I.R.C. § 6603 (2000). In many cases the taxpayer will be unable or unwilling
to make a deposit, which often is the reason that taxpayers seek prepayment review of a deficiency
determination.
262. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2000) (granting refund jurisdiction to the district courts and the
United States Court of Federal Claims).
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public is the use of nondiscretionary, significant civil penalties that are
large enough not only to compensate the system for any revenue lost and
resources expended in collection of properly owed taxes, but also to deter
others from engaging in similar behavior. Tax protestors often raise
frivolous arguments at every possible opportunity. 263 Courts have
recognized that simply allowing the tax protestor an opportunity to voice
his or her objections once will not prevent the tax protestor from coming
back again and again with the same arguments. For instance, the Tax
Court has noted that while “this Court . . . has in the past bent over
backwards to indulge conscientious tax protestors with their legally
frivolous claims, such indulgence has not served to dissuade the very
same protestors from instituting a second frivolous suit on the same stale
issues.” 264 Therefore, deterrence alone does not justify the imposition of
civil penalties on tax protestors. Civil penalties that allowed the
government to recover the costs associated with pursuing collection from
a tax protestor, which would otherwise be borne by compliant
taxpayers, 265 would justify the imposition of penalties.
However, a penalty equal to the cost of pursuing collection and
litigation should not be assessed in all cases. The complexity of the tax
code means that there will inevitably be disputes as to its meaning and
application. Raising legitimate challenges to the code, even if ultimately
unsuccessful, should not be penalized. The proposed penalties should be
imposed to address the costs imposed on the tax system and society as a
result of tax protestors’ claims.
Making penalties mandatory in cases where protestor arguments are
used would mitigate the courts’ reluctance to impose sanctions on pro se
litigants. The court and the Service would have the ability to warn the
individual at the outset that the penalties would be imposed if the
taxpayer continued to present tax protestor arguments, providing some
flexibility and a safeguard against overzealousness.
The contours of tax protestor rhetoric must be defined to allow
imposition of the proposed penalty. An approach similar to that used
against tax shelters should be used. To combat tax shelters, certain

263. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
264. Senesi v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 145 (1981) (imposing I.R.C. § 6673 penalties
and citing to prior cases where protestors had returned with the same arguments in later cases); see
also supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (discussing the repeated litigation involving Irwin
Schiff).
265. See, e.g., Snyder v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 864, 872–73 (1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 813 (8th Cir.
1981).
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transactions are “listed.” 266 The IRS already identifies of frivolous and
meritless schemes and positions to inform taxpayers of positions that
may not be taken without risk of penalty. 267 In addition, the courts have
identified numerous frivolous positions. The IRS’s list of identified
schemes should be combined with the judicially identified frivolous
positions to create a comprehensive list of frivolous arguments, which
would be subject to penalties. Using such a list would provide notice to
taxpayers of the circumstances in which they would be subject to the
proposed penalty and would allow guidance as to the types of positions
that are discouraged.
Taxpayers who simply pursue aggressive positions do not pose the
same threat to the tax system as tax protestors. One of the costs to society
is the maintenance of the judicial system. Legitimate, but ultimately
unsuccessful, challenges to tax issues are an appropriate use of the
judicial and tax administration systems. Moreover, to the extent that tax
shelter or aggressive positions are taken only because they result in a tax
benefit that would not exist without the transactions, the available
penalties, including the penalties that were added to the Code as a result
of the American Jobs Creation Tax Act of 2004, 268 reduce the
profitability of these transactions and may deter many taxpayers from
engaging in these transactions. Only those positions that are completely
without merit and have no basis in law, i.e., the truly frivolous positions,
should be subject to this new penalty. In other words, taxpayers should
not be subject to these penalties simply because they do not succeed at
audit, in the IRS Office of Appeals, or in court. Rather, only taxpayers
who raise and pursue frivolous positions should be subject to additional
penalties.
The proposed penalty is analogous to allowing taxpayers to recover
litigation costs from the IRS when the taxpayer has established that she
exhausted all administrative remedies and that the IRS’s position was not

266. I.R.S. Notice 2004-67, 2004-41 I.R.B. 600 (identifying thirty transactions that must be
reported if engaged in by a taxpayer during the tax year).
267. A number of resources and information on abusive tax scheme and frivolous arguments
are available on the IRS web site, available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small/article/0,,id=106788,00.html
and
http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/
article/0,,id=121259,00.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005). These could be compiled into one or more
notices to identify the arguments that will be pursued and subject to additional penalties as tax
protestor arguments.
268. American Jobs Creation Tax Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, §§ 811, 812, 818, 821; 118
Stat. 1418, 108th Cong. 2nd Sess. (2004) (codified in various sections of the I.R.C.).
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substantially justified. 269 The proposed penalty would allow the
government to recover its costs, both administrative and judicial.
As Part III demonstrates, the arguments that are used by tax
protestors are not supported by legitimate legal arguments. However, it is
possible for tax protestors to have a colorable claim for no imposition of
tax mixed in with frivolous positions. Additionally, simply judging a
claim on its face to be a protestor claim may result in treating inarticulate
taxpayers as tax protestors, which is problematic if the claims made by
protestors are dismissed out of hand.
Maintaining a high compliance rate requires that the majority of the
affected population believe that the system is fair so that they will
continue to self-report their tax liability. Coupling the possibility of a
legitimate claim mingled with tax protestor rhetoric, or inarticulate
claims that appear to be tax protestor claims, with the need for the tax
system to appear to be fair, suggests that simply dismissing tax protestor
claims without consideration would be ill-advised. Notwithstanding the
need to allow a reasonable review of all claims, even if they appear to be
protestor claims, the costs of that review should not be borne by the
majority of taxpayers who do not subscribe to such views and who
voluntarily comply with their tax obligations.
Tax protestors must be permitted to have access to the administrative
and judicial review functions of the tax administration system. However,
to the extent that the claims that they raise are identified as frivolous,
meritless tax protestor positions, the individual raising and pursuing such
claims should bear the burden of those claims. Therefore, penalties equal
to the costs of personnel and overhead to pursue collection both judicial
and administrative should be mandatorily imposed on tax protestors
when their claims are, indeed, frivolous.
C. Application of New Penalties to Tax Protestors
Tax-enforcement resources are limited and not all tax protestors will
be able to pay their tax liabilities, let alone penalties. However, to the
extent possible, resources should be directed to collecting taxes from all
taxpayers with liabilities who can pay. As noted above, many protestor
converts have above-average income and education. 270 Thus, for many
protestors imposing additional penalties will not be meaningless. It will

269. I.R.C. § 7430(a), (b) (2000).
270. See supra notes 42, 77–83 and accompanying text.
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only be meaningless if the Service cannot or will not pursue collection of
their tax liabilities. 271
Of concern is the number of opportunities that are available for tax
protestors to put forward frivolous positions. Not only do tax protestors
have the traditional forums in which they can raise frivolous arguments,
post-RRA 1998, tax protestors can use a CDP hearing as another
opportunity to present frivolous claims. 272 However, CDP hearings and
appeals should be dealt with expeditiously, with additional penalties
imposed for frivolous arguments. 273
Litigation or administrative appeals brought by tax protestors should
not be automatically dismissed. However, many tax protestor cases can
be concluded expeditiously through a motion either to dismiss for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or for
summary judgment. Although in most tax protestor cases it is unlikely
that there will be a meritorious issue, tax protestors can raise legitimate
claims. 274 However, if no legitimate issue is present, rapid disposition of
tax-protestor cases will reduce the amount of judicial resources needed
but will not make these cases cost-free. The Service will still need to
expend a substantial amount of time to draft, serve, and present motions
and responses. This time takes away from the efforts the Service can
direct to other areas of tax administration. Imposing significant penalties
that make up for the costs imposed by tax protestor arguments will solve
concerns both that the tax protestor is unfairly burdening the tax
collection and judicial systems and that the tax collection and judicial
271. Immediately following the enactment of RRA 1998, enforcement activity declined
substantially. Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income, 1999 IRS Data Book Table 21,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/99db21co.xls (last visited Dec. 20, 2005) (reporting that
in fiscal year 1998, before RRA 1998 became effective, IRS enforcement activity consisted of
383,000 Notices of Lien issued, 2,503,000 Notices of Levy on third parties issued, and 2,259
seizures conducted; and in fiscal year 1999, following effective date of RRA 1998, IRS enforcement
activity consisted of 168,000 Notices of Lien issued, 504,000 Notices of Levy on third parties
issued, and 161 seizures conducted). Recently, enforcement has been increased and the IRS intends
to increase enforcement even more. Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income, from 2004 IRS
Data Book, tbl. 16, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04db16co.xls (last visited Dec. 20,
2005) (reporting that in fiscal year 2004 the IRS enforcement activity consisted of 534,392,
2,029,613, and 440, Notices of Lien issued, Notices of Levy issued to third parties, and seizures,
respectively).
272. I.R.C. § 6330 (entitling taxpayers to a CDP hearing prior to levy on their property).
273. See Danshera Cords, Collection Due Process: The Scope and Nature of Judicial Review,
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021 (2005).
274. See Lunsford v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 183 (2001) (challenging the appeals officer’s failure
to conduct a hearing, in addition to raising more of the traditional tax protestor arguments); Cords,
supra note 72, at 65, 101.
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systems must listen to the concerns of taxpayers, even if they are
unlikely to warrant action.
Because one of the concerns that this proposal addresses is the
concern that the tax system must be perceived as fair, warning should be
given to taxpayers who assert the identified tax protestor claims before
the imposition of penalties. After that warning is given, penalties should
include the cost of administrative and court personnel as well as
overhead used to pursue collection of the tax liability. In addition,
because there is always a cost-benefit analysis required in deciding how
to allocate resources, more resources should be devoted to those that
have sufficient assets to pay their liability.
As has been demonstrated, current penalties have not effectively
deterred tax protestors. In addition, a new penalty is also unlikely to
convert dedicated tax protestors. However, if penalties are high enough,
other, compliant taxpayers may not be tempted to convert. In addition,
compliant taxpayers will not bear the burden of both the unpaid share of
the government’s revenue and the cost of pursuing collection. Individuals
who have assets with which to pay their taxes will bear the cost that they
impose on the government for their illegitimate refusal to pay taxes.
D. Use of Penalties Collected
Identifying and pursuing collection from more tax protestors may
require that additional resources be directed to tax enforcement. Using
enforcement to increase compliance requires a greater enforcement
budget. Without a significant and unlikely increase in the Service’s
budget, additional funds will come out of existing budgets, which may
reduce customer service. 275 New sources of revenue will be needed. The
proposed penalties could be used for this purpose. Although there would
be significant benefits, there are also several concerns. First, allowing
penalties imposed on tax protestors to go directly to the Service may
cause disproportionate resources to be directed to tax protestors. Second,
in some instances the penalties could be high relative to the liability,
which may cause courts to resist imposing or upholding the penalties.
Finally, providing another revenue source for the IRS could result in
dangerous funding cuts for this unpopular but essential agency.

275. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
Preface at vii, 8 (2004). The IRS responds that it is not compromising service for compliance and
enforcement activities. Id.
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Because of these concerns, the revenue raised by penalties imposed
on tax protestors should be treated like other penalties and included in
tax revenue. This would not fund additional efforts to increase tax
compliance but would alleviate the concerns generated by directing
penalties to the Service, which could cause a perception of unfairness
and undermine the purpose of the penalty.
VII. CONCLUSION
Voluntary compliance is essential to the efficient and effective
collection of revenue by any government. Allowing certain members of
the society to avoid their obligation to contribute to the government,
simply because they engage in dilatory tactics, is not an acceptable
option. If some succeed, and their success is known, others may be
encouraged to engage in the same behavior. Moreover, it is unfair that
the majority bear the costs to the system resulting from tax protestors’
use of frivolous positions.
Tax protestors cannot be shut out of the system entirely because
others might then fear that they too would be excluded. Tax protestors
will, on occasion, raise valid complaints. Shutting protestors out of the
tax dispute systems would diminish the perception of fairness of the
system. Because fairness of the system is an essential component to
voluntary tax compliance, it should be encouraged, even at a cost. On the
other hand, it is unfair to impose the costs of frivolous positions on those
who comply.
The current penalty provisions do not adequately deter tax protestor
behavior and tax protestors cannot be shut out of either the
administrative or judicial system; therefore, additional penalties must be
imposed. Tax protestors impose costs at the administrative level when
they demand that the IRS and its employees prove to them that income
taxes are constitutional, legally enforceable obligations. These costs are
exacerbated when the tax protestor seeks review of the liability, either
before payment by petitioning the Tax Court, or after payment, which
may have occurred through seizure or mandatory withholding, in the
district courts. Judicial review expends administrative resources
defending the Service’s determinations and collection actions and
judicial resources in addressing motions and trying cases. The costs that
may be incurred in pursuing collection and defending tax deficiency
determinations and collection decisions have been increased with the
adoption of CDP rights. Imposing nondiscretionary penalties on
frivolous arguments will protect the system from both the concerns that
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some will be shut out of the system and that others will have to bear the
cost of the frivolous arguments. The amount of the penalty should be the
amount of the costs incurred by the Service and the courts to collect the
taxes, interest and other penalties owed.
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